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Essays on the Western Labor Markets
Abstract
In Chapter 2, "Accounting for Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Persistence: The
Impact of Taxation and Public Education Expenditure," I study the determinants of cross-country differences
in intergenerational earnings persistence between fathers and sons. Western economies exhibit substantial
differences in the degree of intergenerational earnings persistence between fathers and sons. Earnings
persistence is relatively low in Northern Europe and relatively high in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe.
In this chapter I first document that there is a strong negative cross-country correlation between
intergenerational earnings persistence and tax progressivity, and intergenerational earnings persistence and
public expenditure on tertiary education. I then develop an intergenerational life-cycle model of human
capital accumulation and earnings, which features progressive taxation, public education expenditure, and
borrowing constraints among the determinants of earnings persistence. I calibrate the model to US data and
use it to quantify how earnings persistence in the US changes as I introduce policies from Denmark. Denmark
is an interesting example because it is the country in my sample with the highest and most progressive taxes
and the greatest expenditure on tertiary education, as well as the lowest earnings persistence. I find that the
Danish policies would reduce earnings persistence in the US by reducing parental/individual incentives for
investing in human capital, thereby creating a weaker relationship between the parent's financial resources and
the child's earnings. Quantitatively, taxation is more important than education expenditure. Introducing a
Danish tax policy in the US reduces the intergenerational elasticity of earnings from 0.47 to 0.35, or about
40% of the difference between the US and the Scandinavian countries, which have the lowest earnings
persistence among the countries in my sample. I also find that borrowing constraints have a very limited
impact on earnings persistence.
In Chapter 3, "Marriage Stability, Taxation, and Aggregate Labor Supply in the US vs. Europe," which is joint
work with Indraneel Chakraborty (SMU, Finance) and Serhiy Stepanchuk (UPenn, Economics), we study the
determinants of cross-country differences in aggregate labor supply. Aggregate labor supply is higher in
America than in Europe, and there is also substantial variation within Europe. Using micro data from the US
and eight European countries, we document that the difference between the US and Europe is mainly driven
by the labor supply of women. European women work less than American women, whether it is single women,
married women, or women with and without children. Using a larger number of countries, we also document
that there is a strong correlation between divorce rates and female employment rates across countries and
across time. A recent literature, including Prescott (2004), and Rogerson (2005), argues that differences in
labor supply between the US and Europe can largely be explained by differences in tax rates. We use tax data
from the OECD to develop tax schedules for a sample of 17 countries. The empirical correlation between
hours worked and different measures of tax levels and progressivity is negative, however, weak. Motivated by
these observations, we develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage, and divorce and use it
to study the impact of two mechanisms: 1) differences in marriage stability and 2) differences in tax systems
on labor supply. There are three types of households; single males, single females and married households.
Divorces and marriages occur stochastically. The main channel through which individual divorce and
singlehood rates impact labor supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and thereby providing
incentives for individuals to invest in experience. We calibrate our model to US data and study how labor
supply in the US changes as we introduce European tax systems, and as we replace the US divorce and
marriage rates with their European equivalents. We find that the divorce and tax mechanisms combined on
average explains 28% of the difference between the US and 11 European countries. This finding is sensitive to
the use of tax revenues.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE WESTERN LABOR MARKETS
Hans Aasnes Holter
Dirk Krueger
In Chapter 2, ”Accounting for Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earn-
ings Persistence: The Impact of Taxation and Public Education Expenditure,” I
study the determinants of cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings
persistence between fathers and sons. Western economies exhibit substantial dif-
ferences in the degree of intergenerational earnings persistence between fathers and
sons. Earnings persistence is relatively low in Northern Europe and relatively high
in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe. In this chapter I first document that
there is a strong negative cross-country correlation between intergenerational earn-
ings persistence and tax progressivity, and intergenerational earnings persistence and
public expenditure on tertiary education. I then develop an intergenerational life-
cycle model of human capital accumulation and earnings, which features progressive
taxation, public education expenditure, and borrowing constraints among the de-
terminants of earnings persistence. I calibrate the model to US data and use it to
quantify how earnings persistence in the US changes as I introduce policies from
Denmark. Denmark is an interesting example because it is the country in my sample
with the highest and most progressive taxes and the greatest expenditure on tertiary
education, as well as the lowest earnings persistence. I find that the Danish policies
would reduce earnings persistence in the US by reducing parental/individual incen-
tives for investing in human capital, thereby creating a weaker relationship between
the parent’s financial resources and the child’s earnings. Quantitatively, taxation is
more important than education expenditure. Introducing a Danish tax policy in the
US reduces the intergenerational elasticity of earnings from 0.47 to 0.35, or about
v
40% of the difference between the US and the Scandinavian countries, which have
the lowest earnings persistence among the countries in my sample. I also find that
borrowing constraints have a very limited impact on earnings persistence.
In Chapter 3, ”Marriage Stability, Taxation, and Aggregate Labor Supply in the
US vs. Europe,” which is joint work with Indraneel Chakraborty (SMU, Finance) and
Serhiy Stepanchuk (UPenn, Economics), we study the determinants of cross-country
differences in aggregate labor supply. Aggregate labor supply is higher in America
than in Europe, and there is also substantial variation within Europe. Using micro
data from the US and eight European countries, we document that the difference
between the US and Europe is mainly driven by the labor supply of women. Euro-
pean women work less than American women, whether it is single women, married
women, or women with and without children. Using a larger number of countries,
we also document that there is a strong correlation between divorce rates and female
employment rates across countries and across time. A recent literature, including
Prescott (2004), and Rogerson (2005), argues that differences in labor supply be-
tween the US and Europe can largely be explained by differences in tax rates. We
use tax data from the OECD to develop tax schedules for a sample of 17 countries.
The empirical correlation between hours worked and different measures of tax levels
and progressivity is negative, however, weak. Motivated by these observations, we
develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage, and divorce and use
it to study the impact of two mechanisms: 1) differences in marriage stability and
2) differences in tax systems on labor supply. There are three types of households;
single males, single females and married households. Divorces and marriages occur
stochastically. The main channel through which individual divorce and singlehood
rates impact labor supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and
thereby providing incentives for individuals to invest in experience. We calibrate our
model to US data and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce
vi
European tax systems, and as we replace the US divorce and marriage rates with
their European equivalents. We find that the divorce and tax mechanisms combined
on average explains 28% of the difference between the US and 11 European countries.
This finding is sensitive to the use of tax revenues.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The labor markets of the developed world are characterized by differences in inter-
generational mobility and hours worked, as well as in public policies. My dissertation
consists of two separate papers, each trying to uncover the determinants of cross-
country patterns in the Western labor market outcomes. In Chapter 2, I study the
determinants of cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings persistence be-
tween fathers and sons. In Chapter 3, I investigate the determinants of cross-country
differences in aggregate labor supply.
Chapter 2: ”Accounting for Cross Country Differences in Intergenerational Earn-
ings Persistence: The Impact of Taxation and Public Education Expenditure” West-
ern economies exhibit substantial differences in the degree of intergenerational earn-
ings persistence between fathers and sons. Earnings persistence is relatively low in
Northern Europe, and relatively high in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe. In
this paper I first document that there is a strong negative cross-country correlation
between earnings persistence and tax progressivity, and earnings persistence and
public expenditure on tertiary education. I then provide an intergenerational life-
cycle model of human capital accumulation and earnings to separate and quantify
the determinants of earnings persistence. The model contains key elements which
1
has been proposed as determinants of earnings persistence in the literature, namely:
progressive taxation, the efficiency of human capital investments, public education
expenditure, borrowing constraints, partially inheritable abilities, inter vivos trans-
fers from parent to child, and idiosyncratic wage shocks. I calibrate the model to
US data, and decompose the contributions of the different model elements. Next I
study how earnings persistence in the US changes as I introduce policies from Den-
mark into the model. Denmark is an interesting example because it is the country
in my sample with the highest and most progressive taxes and greatest expenditure
on tertiary education, as well as the lowest earnings persistence. I find that taxation
and public education expenditure have a significant impact on earnings persistence
and therefore are important contributors to the cross country patterns which empir-
ical researchers have found. More government expenditure on education and higher
taxes reduce earnings persistence by reducing parental/individual incentives for in-
vesting in human capital, which leads to a weaker relationship between the financial
resources of the parent and the earnings of the child. The impact of taxation is quan-
titatively greater than the impact of education expenditure. Introducing a Danish
tax system in the US, reduces the intergenerational elasticity of earnings by 0.12, or
about 40% of the difference between the US and the Scandinavian countries, which
have the lowest earnings persistence among the countries in my sample. I also study
the quantitative importance of borrowing constraints in the model and conclude that
they have very little impact on earnings persistence.
Chapter 3: ”Marriage Stability, Taxation, and Aggregate Labor Supply in the
US vs. Europe,” joint with Indraneel Chakraborty (SMU, Finance) and Serhiy Step-
anchuk (UPenn, Economics). Aggregate labor supply is higher in America than in
Europe, and there is also substantial variation within Europe. Using micro data from
the US and eight European countries, we document that the difference between the
US and Europe is mainly driven by the labor supply of women. European women
2
work less than American women, whether it is single women, married women, or
women with and without children. Using a larger number of countries, we also docu-
ment that there is a strong correlation between divorce rates and female employment
rates across countries and across time. A recent literature, including Prescott (2004),
and Rogerson (2005), argues that differences in labor supply between the US and
Europe can largely be explained by differences in tax rates. We use tax data from
the OECD to develop tax schedules for a sample of 17 countries. The empirical cor-
relation between hours worked and different measures of tax levels and progressivity
is negative, however, weak. Motivated by these observations, we develop a life-cycle
model with heterogeneous agents, marriage, and divorce and use it to study the im-
pact of two mechanisms: 1) differences in marriage stability and 2) differences in tax
systems on labor supply. There are three types of households; single males, single
females and married households. Divorces and marriages occur stochastically. The
main channel through which individual divorce and singlehood rates impact labor
supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and thereby providing in-
centives for individuals to invest in experience. We calibrate our model to US data
and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce European tax systems,
and as we replace the US divorce and marriage rates with their European equivalents.
We find that the divorce and tax mechanisms combined on average explains 28% of
the difference between the US and 11 European countries. This finding is sensitive
to the use of tax revenues.
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Chapter 2
Accounting for Cross-Country
Differences in Intergenerational
Earnings Persistence: The Impact
of Taxation and Public Education
Expenditure
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, several empirical studies have been concerned with estimating and
comparing the intergenerational persistence of earnings between fathers and sons
in Western economies. The main finding of this literature is that intergenerational
persistence is relatively high in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe, and relatively
low in Northern Europe and in Canada. Table 2.1 below displays the results from a
meta study of intergenerational earnings persistence across countries by Corak (2006)
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Table 2.1: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticity Across Countries
Country Estimated Earnings Elasticity
Denmark 0.15
Norway 0.17
Finland 0.18
Canada 0.19
Sweden 0.27
Germany 0.32
Spain** 0.40
France 0.41
Italy* 0.43
USA 0.47
UK 0.50
This table displays the results from a meta study by Heinz Corak (2006).
*Taken from Piraino (2007). **Taken from Pla (2009). Pla estimates
one earnings elasticity using sons aged 30-40, and one earnings elasticity
using sons aged 40-50. The number listed is the average of the two.
1, supplemented with two recent studies from Italy and Spain2. The next question
follows naturally: What are the reasons for these differences? Western economies
differ greatly with respect to public expenditure on education and with respect to tax
schemes. Does the cross-country variation in public institutions explain the variation
in earnings persistence? Understanding why earnings mobility differs across countries
is interesting, even if only for positive reasons. However, the question of whether
economic fate is predetermined or whether it is influenced by public institutions may
also have important policy implications. For instance, if the pattern we observe
occurs because poor parents in some countries are borrowing constrained and cannot
invest optimally in their children’s human capital, it may call for policy intervention.
Several explanations that could contribute to the observed cross-country pattern
in intergenerational earnings persistence have been proposed in the economic litera-
ture, but there is little quantitative work in the area. To the best of my knowledge
there are no previous papers studying the impact of cross-country differences in poli-
1See also Blanden (2009) for an extensive summary of the empirical literature.
2There are many difficulties with comparing different studies of earnings persistence; see Ap-
pendix 2.10.1. Table 2.1 is to be interpreted as a stylized fact.
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cies on earnings persistence. I start by documenting that there is a strong negative
cross-country correlation between earnings persistence and tax progressivity, and
earnings persistence and public expenditure on tertiary education. I then provide
an intergenerational life-cycle model of human capital accumulation and earnings to
separate and quantify the determinants of earnings persistence. The model contains
key elements that have been proposed as determinants of earnings persistence in the
literature, namely, progressive taxation, the efficiency of human capital investments,
public education expenditure, borrowing constraints, partially inheritable abilities,
inter vivos transfers from parents to children, and idiosyncratic wage shocks. I cali-
brate the model to US data and decompose the contributions of the different model
elements.
Next I study how earnings persistence in the US changes as I introduce policies
from Denmark into the model. Denmark is an interesting example because it is
the country in my sample with the highest and most progressive taxes and greatest
expenditure on tertiary education, as well as the lowest earnings persistence. I find
that taxation and public education expenditure have a significant impact on earnings
persistence and therefore are important contributors to the cross-country patterns
that empirical researchers have found. More government expenditure on education
and higher taxes reduce earnings persistence by reducing parental/individual incen-
tives for investing in human capital, which leads to a weaker relationship between the
parents financial resources and the childs earnings. The impact of taxation is quan-
titatively greater than the impact of education expenditure. Introducing a Danish
tax system in the US reduces the intergenerational elasticity of earnings from 0.47 to
0.35, or about 40% of the difference between the US and the Scandinavian countries,
which have the lowest earnings persistence among the countries in my sample. I
also study the quantitative importance of borrowing constraints in the model and
conclude that they have very little impact on earnings persistence.
6
Determinants of Earnings Persistence
In classical human capital theory, it is usually assumed that the earnings of individ-
uals depend on their level of human capital and on market luck, or random shocks.
Two factors go into human capital formation. One is a fixed endowment, imperfectly
inherited by children from parents, and the other is investments in human capital,
which can be made both by the parents and by the government; see Becker and
Tomes (1979), Becker and Tomes (1986), and Solon (2004). Endowments here refer
to everything from genetically inherited ability to knowledge acquired from the par-
ents, family culture, and the parents social connections. In my model below I will
refer to the family endowment as ability. The narrowest definition of human capital
investment is investment in education, but many authors use broader definitions. It
is also commonly assumed that parents care about their childrens utility and that
utility depends only on the consumption of goods that cannot be considered as in-
vestments in human capital; see, for instance, Becker and Tomes (1986). This way,
the only reason to invest in childrens human capital is to increase their future con-
sumption through higher earnings. If there are diminishing returns to investment,
there will be an optimal level of investment for each child.
From this theory, several explanations for cross-country differences in earnings
persistence emerge. One possibility is that the inheritability of family endowments
is stronger in some countries. There could be many underlying reasons for this.
The degree of assortative mating does, for instance, differ across countries. In some
countries, couples are more similar with respect to their education and family back-
ground, and since almost all research studies the correlation between fathers and
sons, this will cause the sons to be more similar to their fathers. Indeed, there seems
to be a somewhat higher correlation in spousal education in the US and Italy than
in Northern Europe, but Britain, which has relatively high earnings persistence, has
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a relatively low correlation in spousal education.3
Another possibility is that countries just differ in the returns to human capital
or the cost of acquiring it. In standard intergenerational models of earnings forma-
tion, earnings persistence increases with the returns to human capital investments;
see, for instance, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). Depending on modeling choices,
there are several channels through which this may work, but I will mention just a
common one: Optimal human capital investments are usually increasing in parental
financial resources, as altruistic parents face a tradeoff between their own consump-
tion today and their children’s future consumption. If human capital investments
become more efficient, then for a given inequality of investments in children of high
and low earners, the inequality of earnings outcomes will increase. This results in
higher intergenerational earnings persistence. In Section 2.3 below, I illustrate this
mechanism with a simple model. Tax codes are also plausible explanations for the
cross-country differences in earnings persistence, as they affect the incentives to in-
vest in human capital. If taxes are progressive, it will have the effect that human
capital investments become less attractive, particularly for someone with high abil-
ity. This will shrink the dispersion of human capital investments and cause smaller
earnings persistence. In Section 2.2, I document a negative correlation between tax
progressivity and earnings persistence.
If there are diminishing returns to human capital investments, and investments
made by parents and the government are substitutes, then a parent’s incentive to
invest will be falling as the government invests more. As the government invests
more, the difference between how much is invested in rich and poor children becomes
smaller and earnings persistence will fall. Western economies differ with respect to
public education expenditure. As I document in Section 2.2, the countries with low
earnings persistence tend to spend more on public investments in education relative
3See Fernandez, Guner, and Knowles (2005)
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to GDP per capita. The difference is particularly large when it comes to spending
on tertiary education.
Finally, one potential cause of earnings persistence that has received much at-
tention in the literature is the presence of credit constraints. As mentioned above,
there will usually be a direct relationship between parents’ and childrens earnings.
This will be true even if the parents are not credit-constrained with respect to their
own resources, and if human capital investments are risky it may also be true even
if they are not credit constrained with respect to their children’s future earnings. A
stronger relationship may, however, occur if low earners with high ability/endowment
children face binding credit-constraints with respect to investing in their childrens
human capital. One potential source of cross-country differences in earnings persis-
tence is the degree of credit market completeness. I do not have any good measure
of credit market completeness across countries, but if the government heavily sub-
sidizes education, it should reduce the number of credit-constrained parents. In my
structural model below, I do, however, find that increasing or decreasing borrowing
limits has very little quantitative impact on earnings persistence in the US.
Empirical Literature
The most commonly used measure of earnings persistence is the coefficient, often
denoted , from the regression of the logarithm of the sons earnings on the logarithm
of the fathers earnings and a constant, also called the intergenerational elasticity of
earnings:
log (yson) = α + β log (yfather) +  (2.1)
The relevant measure of earnings is lifetime or permanent earnings, but as this mea-
sure is rarely available, the best a researcher can do is often to average several years
of earnings and control for the age at which the earnings were observed. What β tells
us, in a purely statistical sense, is what percentage of a fathers earnings advantage,
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relative to the mean in his generation, that is on average transferred to the son. A β
of 0 would represent the case in which the earnings of fathers and sons are completely
unrelated, while a β of 1 would represent the case in which the earnings advantage of
the father is perfectly transferred to the son. Hypothetically, one can also imagine β
smaller than 0 or greater than 1. In practice, however, empirical studies have found
β between 0 and 1, which implies that earnings tend to revert to the mean over
generations.
The statistical literature, which estimates and compares the intergenerational
elasticity of earnings for different countries, is by now quite large. Blanden (2009)
provides a thorough discussion. There are some difficulties related to methodology
and data, which makes it harder to compare different studies (see Appendix 2.10.1).
It is, however, clear that there are substantial differences between countries. Corak
(2006) provides a meta study based on previous empirical studies of earnings persis-
tence in different countries and current knowledge of data and methodological issues.
Table 2.1 reproduces the main findings of his study, supplemented with two recent
studies from Italy and Spain. It documents the pattern with relatively high earnings
persistence in the US, Britain, and Southern Europe, and relatively low earnings
persistence in Northern Europe and in Canada.
Quantitative Literature
In addition to the empirical work, there is also a theoretical literature, pioneered by
Becker and Tomes, which gives us a framework for understanding the factors that may
affect the correlation of childrens and parents earnings. The quantitative/structural
literature, which takes models to the data, is, however, very sparse. I will briefly
mention the two papers that are closest in spirit to the work I am undertaking.
Han and Mulligan (2001) develop a very simple two-period/two-generation model
in which parents care about their children and have the opportunity to invest in their
human capital and to give them monetary bequests. They calibrate their model to
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fit characteristics of the US economy, including the intergenerational elasticity of
earnings, β, which they take to be 0.4. They then study how β changes as they
eliminate intergenerational borrowing constraints and increase the variance of shocks
to ability. The authors conclude that eliminating borrowing constraints reduces β
by up to 0.1, but they also find that β increases as the heterogeneity of family
endowments increases. They suggest that if there is a greater variance of family
endowments in the US and Britain, perhaps because those countries are more racially
and culturally diverse, then this result could be used to explain higher earnings
persistence in those countries. However, it is not an obvious result or theoretical
implication that a larger variance of family endowments should lead to larger and
not smaller persistence. This is something that comes out of their specific model
for specific parameter values. It should also be noted that in their model agents
experience the same shocks to human capital and financial assets. It is therefore no
insurance in holding both assets. An individual will invest in human capital until
the return equals the return on financial assets, and if needed borrow financial assets
to achieve this level of human capital investment. This may increase the importance
of borrowing constraints.
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) develop a model with infinite dynasties in which
agents live for four periods: two as children and two as adults. Parents decide
how much to invest in their childrens elementary education and whether to send
them to college. There is also a government that imposes taxes, runs a balanced
budget, and invests the tax revenues in education. The focus of the paper is to
determine whether investments in early or college education are quantitatively more
important for earnings persistence. They find that early education matters more and
that government investments in early education have a much greater impact than
government investments in college education.
My paper is the first to study the impact of cross-country differences in policies
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on β. It turns out that across countries there is greater variation in spending on
tertiary education than on early education. Tertiary education spending therefore
seems like a more likely explanation for cross-country differences in β. My paper also
offers a richer, more realistic model, combining some elements that are present in
each of the two papers above. In Section 2.5, I discuss the different model elements
in detail and why they are important in a study of earnings persistence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, I document
the correlation between and tax progressivity and between and spending on tertiary
education. Section 2.3 studies the impact of taxation and public investment in educa-
tion on in a simple analytical model. Section 2.4 presents the quantitative model. In
Section 2.5, I discuss and justify some of the modeling choices. Section 2.6 discusses
data and calibration. Section 2.7 decomposes the contributions to earnings persis-
tence from the different model elements. Section 2.8 presents results from policy
experiments. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Correlations Between Earnings Persistence and
Tax Progressivity and Earnings Persistence and
Public Spending on Tertiary Education
It is difficult to summarize the tax system in a country with just one number. A
commonly used measure of tax progressivity is so-called progressivity wedges; see,
for instance, Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009):
PW (y1, y2) = 1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
(2.2)
This measure says something about how fast the tax rate increases as earnings in-
crease from y1 to y2. If there is a flat tax, then the progressivity wedge would be
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Figure 2.1: Correlation Between Tax Progressivity and Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence from Table 2.1. The tax data is an average of the years 2001-
2005, taken from the OECD Tax and Benefit Calculator and the OECD Tax Database.
The regression coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
zero for all levels of y1 and y2. For each country in Table 2.1, I use labor income
tax data from the OECD tax database to fit a tax function; see Appendix 2.10.2 for
a detailed description. I then construct progressivity wedges using the average tax
rate. I use the average earnings, AE, in each country for y1 and four times aver-
age earnings for y1. In Figure 2.1, I plot earnings persistence on the y-axis against
this measure of tax progressivity on the x-axis. The correlation between the two
quantities is -0.81 and the regression coefficient is highly significant when earnings
persistence is regressed on the progressivity wedges. A strong correlation between
two variables need not imply, of course, that one has a causal effect on the other.
However, this empirical observation motivates a further investigation of the impact
of taxes on earnings persistence in a structural model with careful modeling of the
tax systems. In Figure 2.2, I plot the correlation between earnings persistence and
public expenditure per student in tertiary education as a fraction of GDP per capita.
The correlation between the two variables is -0.84, and the regression coefficient is
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Figure 2.2: Correlation Between Public Expenditure on Tertiary Education and
Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence from Table 2.1. The education spending data are an average of
the years 1999-2005, taken from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. The regression
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
highly significant when earnings persistence is regressed on education expenditure.
2.3 Gaining Intuition: The Impact of Taxation
and Public Education Expenditure on Inter-
generational Earnings Persistence in a Simple
Model
To obtain an intuitive understanding of how taxation and public education expendi-
ture qualitatively affect earnings persistence, it may be helpful to start with a simple
model. The model is a slight modification of Solon (2004), where I have changed
the wage function and the process for inheritance of abilities to be similar to the
wage function and the process for inheritance of abilities in the quantitative model
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of Section 2.4. Assume that there is a continuum of infinitely lived single individual
dynasties. Each individual lives for two periods: one as a child and one as an adult.
Parents decide how much to consume and how much to invest in their children’s hu-
man capital, while children do not make any economic decisions. A parent’s utility
is a function of today’s consumption, ct , and his child’s future earnings, yt+1:
Ut(ct, yt+1) = log (ct) + α log (yt+1) (2.3)
The parameter α measures how altruistic parents are with respect to their children.
The earnings of the child are determined by his level of human capital. Human
capital is a function of investments made by the parents, It, investments made by
the government, Ig, and of the childs ability or family endowment, At:
yt+1 = γht+1 (2.4)
ht+1 = At+1(It + Ig)
ψ (2.5)
Abilities are imperfectly transmitted from parent to child. I assume them to be
log-normally distributed, and follow an AR(1)-process:
log (At+1) = θ log (At) + ν, ν ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν) (2.6)
Assuming that labor income is taxed at rate τ , the utility maximization problem of
a parent can now be written as:
max
ct>0,It≥0
log (ct) + α log (yt+1)
s.t. : ct + It = yt(1− τ)
yt+1 = γAt+1(It + Ig)
ψ (2.7)
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Substituting for ct, and yt+1, gives a maximization problem in It:
max
0≤It<yt
log (yt(1− τ)− It) + αψ log (It + Ig) + α log (At+1) + α log (γ) (2.8)
The first-order condition is:
−1
yt(1− τ)− It
+
αψ
It + Ig
≤ 0
−1
yt(1− τ)− It
+
αψ
It + Ig
= 0, if It > 0 (2.9)
Rearranging this expression we get the following solution for It:
It =


αψ
1+αψ
yt(1− τ)−
1
1+αψ
Ig, if yt >
Ig
αψ(1−τ)
0, else
(2.10)
As long as there is an interior solution, It is decreasing in the tax rate, τ , decreasing in
government investment, Ig, increasing with the altruism parameter, α, and increasing
in the human capital production function parameter, ψ. Substituting for It in 2.5
and taking the log of 2.4, we get an equation relating the log of the earnings of
children to the earnings of their parents:
log (yt+1)
=


ψ log (yt(1− τ) + Ig) + log (θAt + ν) + log
(
γ( αψ
1+αψ
)ψ
)
, if yt >
Ig
αψ(1−τ)
ψ log (Ig) + log (θAt + ν) + log
(
γ( αψ
1+αψ
)ψ
)
, else
(2.11)
Proposition 2.3.1.
If yt >
Ig
αψ(1− τ)
and Ig > 0 then
∂2 log (yt+1)
∂ log (yt)∂τ
< 0,
∂2 log (yt+1)
∂ log (yt)∂Ig
< 0,
∂2 log (yt+1)
∂ log (yt)∂ψ
> 0 (2.12)
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Proof: See Appendix 2.10.3
Proposition 2.3.1 states that as long as both the parental investment and the gov-
ernment investment are positive, the impact of the parent’s earnings on the child’s
earnings become smaller when there is a higher tax level or more government in-
vestment, or when human capital production is more efficient. In the case of the
tax, this happens because a smaller share of the parent’s earnings can be devoted to
investing in human capital when the tax is higher. Government investment, which
is equal for all children, then accounts for a larger share of the total human capi-
tal investment, and a given percentage change, or a change in the log, of parental
earnings will have a smaller impact on the log of the child’s earnings. However, if
government investments were zero, then the flat tax could be separated out as a con-
stant term. When government investment increases, it has the same effect as when
the tax increases. The relative importance of parental earnings is decreasing when Ig
increases. The impact of parental earnings on the child’s earnings is increasing in the
human capital production function parameter, ψ. This is simply because an increase
in ψ increases the effect of parental investments. The equation usually estimated by
empirical researchers studying intergenerational earnings persistence is:
log (yit+1) = α + β log (yit) + it+1 (2.13)
where i denotes the family or dynasty. If we assume that the government in-
vests a constant fraction of average earnings in education, Ig = I˜gy¯, and that
yit >
Ig
αψ(1−τ)
∀ i, which implies that all parents invest a positive amount in their
child’s human capital, we only have to consider the first part of equation 2.11. Let us
also assume that the economy is in steady state; i.e., the cross-sectional distributions
of log (yit+1) and log (yit) are identical. With the purpose of obtaining an analytical
solution for the regression coefficient, β, we can log-linearize the first part of 2.11
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around average earnings, y¯, and average ability, A¯:
log (yit+1) = α
∗ +
ψ(1− τ)
(1− τ) + I˜g
log (yit) + log (Ait+1)
where α∗ = ψ log
(
y¯
(
(1− τ) + I˜g
))
+ log
(
γ(
αψ
1 + αψ
)ψ
)
−
ψ(1− τ)
(1− τ) + I˜g
y¯ (2.14)
Equation 2.14 now resembles the classical linear regression equation in 2.13, except
that the error term, log (Ait+1), is correlated with the explanatory variable, log (yit).
This is because both log (Ait+1) and log (yit) depend on log (Ait). OLS estimates of
the slope will therefore be biased. Equation 2.14 is a first-order autoregression where
the error term follows the AR(1)-process as in 2.6. It is shown in Greene (2000),
pp. 534-535, that when V ar
(
log (yit+1)
)
= V ar
(
log (yit)
)
the probability limit of
the OLS-estimator for the slope coefficient in this equation is given by the sum of
the true slope coefficient and the autoregressive parameter of the error term divided
by one plus their product. Using this result we get that in the population regression
where 2.14 is estimated by OLS:
β =
(ψ + θ)(1− τ) + θI˜g
(1 + ψθ)(1− τ) + I˜g
(2.15)
Proposition 2.3.2.
∂β
∂τ
< 0,
∂β
∂I˜g
< 0,
∂β
∂ψ
> 0,
∂β
∂θ
> 0 (2.16)
Proof: See Appendix 2.10.3
Thus, in this simple model, we have seen that an increase in the level of taxes
and/or government investment in education reduces earnings persistence by reducing
the direct impact of parental earnings on the child’s earnings (Proposition 2.3.1). The
intuition behind the result is that the relative importance of parental investments
compared to government investments decreases. The difference between how much is
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invested in rich and poor children becomes smaller in percent/log terms as taxes or
government investments increase, and this leads to a fall in earnings persistence. β
is, not surprisingly, increasing in the correlation of parent’s and child’s ability, θ. It
is also increasing in the human capital production function parameter, ψ. It should
be noted that the relationship between the market return to human capital, γ, and
β generally is sensitive to the specification of the wage function. I have specified a
constant return to a unit of human capital, and γ does not enter the expression for
β. In Solons original model, an exponential return to human capital was specified
and γ would then be present in the expression for β.
As long as the tax is flat in this model, there is a linear relationship between hu-
man capital investments and parental earnings. The percentage variation of private
investments is the same when all parents invest a positive amount and the tax level
increases; however, the percentage variation in total investments decreases because
private investments are smaller compared to public investments. Introducing a pro-
gressive tax may have had the effect of decreasing the percentage variation in private
investments, and this would also reduce earnings persistence. We will now turn to
the study of a more realistic model with the purpose of quantifying the determinants
of earnings persistence.
2.4 Model
Economic Environment
The economy is populated by single-individual dynasties, where each individual lives
for at least 70 years and at most 100 years. A model period is five years. For the first
four periods, or 20 years, of his life, an individual is part of the parents household
and does not make any economic decisions. At age 20, a young individual moves
out of his parent’s house and forms his own household. At age 30, he has a child,
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Figure 2.3: Household’s Life Cycle
and at age 65 he retires. The first decision a young adult must make is whether
or not to enroll in college. All working age households, including college students,
decide how much to work, consume, and save at a risk-free rate. College students
also decide how much to invest in human capital production. There is a fixed time
cost of attending college, and college students have to work at a low fixed wage,
which is independent of their human capital. There is a probability of failing college,
depending on the student’s ability and prior level of human capital. Households are
altruistic and care about their childrens utility. Households with a child, ages 5 to
19, decide how much to invest in the childs human capital. At the moment a child
leaves home and begins his own household, the parent has the option of giving him
a one-time gift of liquid assets to ensure that he gets a good start in life. This is, of
course, a simplifying assumption, but it greatly reduces the complexity of the model.
Empirically, the fact that the child receives a one-time gift at the beginning of his
adult life can be motivated by the observation that many parents help their child
with paying for college or with buying a first home. Figure 2.3 illustrates the life
cycle of a household.
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Wages and Human Capital
Worker productivity in this economy depends on human capital, college completion,
labor market experience, and labor market luck. Since there is no unemployment in
the model, experience is equal to potential experience and is fully determined by age
and whether a person attended college. Letting x denote the individual’s experience
level and h denote his level of human capital, his wage can be written:
w = hγ0e
γj1x+γ
j
2x
2+γj3x
3+u (2.17)
u ∼ N(0, σ2u) (2.18)
Where u is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, and j ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for
whether the individual is college educated. There are different age/experience paths
for the wages of college- and high-school-educated workers. The human capital of a
person must be built up during his childhood and during college. How much human
capital a person accumulates depends on his ability, A, and how much is invested in
his human capital in each time period by the parents, Ip, by the individual himself
in college, Is, and by the government, Ig:
h′ = h+ A
[
h(Ip + Ig)
]ψ0
h′ = h+ A
[
h(Is + Ig)
]ψ1 (2.19)
Here h′ denotes human capital in the next time period. I follow the tradition in the
literature on intergenerational earnings persistence (see Becker and Tomes (1979),
Becker and Tomes (1986), and Solon (2004)) and think of human capital investments
as investments of money or goods. However, while many definitions of what should
be considered human capital investments have been suggested, I will think of it as
investment in education. The ability or family endowment of the child is broadly
defined to include things that do not have to be bought, like genetics, family culture,
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motivation, and knowledge acquired from the parents. Abilities are assumed to be
log-normally distributed and imperfectly inherited from parent to child according to
an AR(1) process:
log (Ac) = θ log (Ap) + ν, ν ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν) (2.20)
2.19 is the same functional form as in Ben-Porath (1967), except that Ben-Porath
allowed for different exponentials on the human capital and goods inputs. The same
production function has been used in some recent studies involving human capital
accumulation; see, for instance, Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007), or Ionescu
(2009). These studies do, however, ignore the input of goods in the production
of human capital and focus on the human capital input, which is modeled as the
product of previous human capital and time. They are also different in that they
focus on human capital accumulation during work-life and/or college. In my model
the input of time is kept constant, and human capital accumulation starts at age 5.
It is known that the efficiency of human capital investments varies by age (see Cunha
and Heckman (2007)), and this is the rationale for specifying different technologies
before college and in college. One could have used a different technology at every
age but this would complicate the model.
Preferences
The momentary utility is a function of consumption in adult equivalents, c
e(t)
, where
e(t) varies depending on whether there is a child in the household, and work hours,
n:
u(c, n) =
(
c
e(t)
)1−σ
1− σ
− χ
n1+η
1 + η
(2.21)
A household discounts the future by a factor, δ. When the child leaves home, the
parent cares about the child’s utility, U c, but discounts it by, α. Thus a household’s
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lifetime utility, U , is given by:
U =
death∑
t=1
δt−1u(c, n) + δ6αU c (2.22)
Borrowing for College and Probability of College Completion
Individuals who attend college are allowed to borrow up to an amount, z, while in
college. I require that they do not retire in debt, and in subsequent periods, I let the
borrowing constraint, φ(j, t), be linearly decreasing between college and retirement.
High school graduates are not allowed to borrow:
φ(j = 1, t) = max
(
0, z(9− t)
)
, φ(j = 0, t) = 0 (2.23)
However, if someone took out a loan for college and failed to complete college, they
will also be subject to the borrowing constraint for college graduates. The probability
of success in college, pi(Ah), is a function of ability and acquired pre-college human
capital:
pi(Ah) = 1− eΩAh (2.24)
Recursive Formulation of the Household’s Problem
A household can be in five different life stages, and therefore, there are five different
household maximization problems. The first decision a young household must make
is whether or not to go to college. This is done at age 20, or t = 1. In both cases he
decides how much to consume, c, next period’s capital, k′, and how much to work,
n. If he goes to college, he must also decide how much to invest in human capital,
Is. The state variables are age, t, capital, k, his level of human capital, h, his ability,
A, and the productivity shock, u. In all time periods, experience, x, will be equal to
the current model period minus 4 for high-school-educated workers and equal to the
current model period minus 5 for college-educated workers. Formally, the individual
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solves the following Bellman problem:
W (k, h, t = 1, A, u) = max{V (j = 0, ·), V (j = 1, ·)}, where :
V (0, k, h, t, A, u) = max
c,n,k′
u(c, n) + δE
[
V ′(0, k′, h, t′, A, u′)
]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + wn
(
1− τ(wn)
)
c > 0, k′ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, t′ = t+ 1
w = hγ0e
γ01x+γ
0
2x
2+γ03x
3+u, u ∼ N(0, σ2u)
V (1, k, h, t, A, u) = max
c,n,k′,Is
u(c, n+$) + δpi(h,A)E
[
V ′(1, k′, h′, t′, A, u′)
]
+δ
(
1− pi(h,A)
)
E
[
V ′(0, k′, h, t′, A, u′)
]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + wn
(
1− τ(wn)
)
− Is
c > 0, Is ≥ 0, h
′ = h+ A
[
h(Is + Ig)
]ψ1 , k′ ≥ φ(1, 1), 0 ≤ n ≤ 1−$
w = wc, w
′ = hγ0e
γj1x+γ
j
2x
2+γj3x
3+u, u ∼ N(0, σ2u), t
′ = t+ 1 (2.25)
$ is here the time cost of attending college, τc is a flat consumption tax, and τ(wn)
is a non-linear labor income tax rate. Also note that while in college, an individual
must work at the fixed wage, wc, which is independent of his level of human capital.
The problem of a working household without a child and at age 30 when no human
capital investments are made is:
V (j, k, h, t, A, u) = max
c,n,k′
u(c, n) + δE
[
V ′(j, k′, h, t′, A, u′)
]
(2.26)
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + w(j, t, h, u)n
(
1− τ(w(j, t, h, u)n)
)
k′ ≥ φ(j, t), 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, c > 0, t′ = t+ 1, for t = 2, 3, 8, 9 (age = 25, 30, 55, 60)
At age 30, (20) is also a constraint, as the ability of the child will be revealed in the
next period, and the parent must have an expectation of his child’s ability. Between
ages 35 and 50 the parent must also decide on how much to invest in the child’s
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human capital. He solves:
V (j, k, hp, hc, t, A, u) = max
c,n,k′,Ip
u(c, n) + δE
[
V ′(j, k′, hp, h
′
c, t
′, A, u′)
]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ + Ip = k(1 + r) + w(j, t, h, u)n
(
1− τ(w(j, t, h, u)n)
)
Ip ≥ 0, h
′
c = hc + A
[
hc(Ip + Ig)
]ψ0 , k′ ≥ φ(j, t)
0 ≤ n ≤ 1, c > 0, t′ = t+ 1, for 4 ≤ t ≤ 6 (35 ≤ age ≤ 50) (2.27)
hp here denotes the human capital of the parent, and hc denotes the human capital
of the child. The parent must keep track of both as state variables. A is now the
ability of the child. There is no reason for the parent to know his own ability after
the childs ability is revealed. When the parent is age 50 and the child is age 20, the
child leaves the household and the parent has a one-time opportunity to give him a
gift or an inter vivos transfer, b. The parent’s problem is:
V (j, k, hp, hc, t = 7, A, u) = max
c,n,k′,b
u(c, n) + δE
[
V ′p(j, k
′, hp, h
′
c, t = 8, u
′
p)
]
+αE
[
Wc(b, hc, t = 1, A, uc)
]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ + b = k(1 + r) + w(j, t, h, u)n
(
1− τ(w(j, t, h, u)n)
)
k′ ≥ φ(j, t), c > 0, 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, b ≥ 0, t′ = t+ 1 (2.28)
α here controls the parent’s degree of altruism. I assume that the parent does not
observe the child’s idiosyncratic shock before the size of the gift is decided. He
must, therefore, take the expectation of the child’s value function with respect to the
idiosyncratic shock. A household in retirement simply solves:
V (j, k, h, t, A, u) = max
c>0,k′≥0
u(c, n = 0) + δΓ(t)E
[
V ′(k′, t′)
]
s.t. : c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + T
for 10 ≤ t ≤ 16 (65 ≤ age ≤ 95) (2.29)
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T here is a constant amount of social security, and Γ(t) is an age-dependent proba-
bility of survival to the next period.
2.5 Discussion of Modeling Choices
Life-Cycle Model with College Decision
Using a life-cycle model with college decision allows us to study government expen-
diture on different levels of education. We can separate the effects of spending on
primary, secondary, and tertiary education. The cross-country variation in public
education expenditure is largest for tertiary education. Another argument for us-
ing a life-cycle model is that when studying the impact of parents’ earnings on the
earnings of children, we are interested in the financial resources available to parents
at the time when there are children in the household. There is a literature docu-
menting that even after controlling for parents’ lifetime income, the income of the
parents during the childhood years matters for the children’s income; see Cunha and
Heckman (2007) for a survey.
Physical Capital, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Human Capital
I will argue that in a realistic quantitative model developed to study intergenerational
earnings persistence, it is important to have financial assets and a mechanism for
transfers from parent to child, in addition to human capital. The existence of physical
capital in the model affects how much is invested in a child’s human capital in
various ways. In a model without financial assets, parents will divide their resources
between their own consumption today and their children’s future consumption or,
equivalently, their children’s human capital. This may create a too strong correlation
between the earnings of the parent and the child’s human capital, as the optimal
investment in the child will always be increasing in the earnings of the parent. If
there is physical capital and diminishing returns to human capital investments, there
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will be a point at which the return on capital is strictly higher than the return on
human capital, and this will put a cap on human capital investments. Children with
low ability but rich parents will earn a lot more in a world with no financial assets,
because the only way to help them is to invest in their human capital. With physical
capital, their parents will rather give them some financial assets. Furthermore, since
there is uncertainty in the model, parents would like to accumulate some physical
capital to insure against negative shocks, even when the expected return on human
capital investments is higher than the return on physical capital. This will take
resources away from human capital investments. Finally, a popular explanation both
for earnings persistence (see, for instance, Han and Mulligan (2001)), and for college
enrollment in the literature is the existence of borrowing constraints. To study the
impact of borrowing constraints, it is crucial that the model have financial assets.
Labor Supply
Allowing agents in the model to choose their work hours affects the returns to human
capital investments and will be important for the shape of the optimal investment
policy as a function of physical capital. In Figure 2.4, I illustrate this point by
plotting the optimal investment in human capital for an individual in college. As
can be seen from the figure, the optimal investment peaks at some point and starts
sloping downwards. This is because, as the agent becomes wealthier, he will enjoy
more leisure in the future and the returns to investing in human capital are falling.
Some families accumulate a lot of physical capital, but the fact that they enjoy leisure
and can control their labor supply will affect the shape of their optimal human capital
investments.
Labor supply is also potentially important for college enrollment and for the
importance of borrowing constraints with respect to human capital investments; see
Garriga and Keightley (2007), and Keane and Wolpin (2001). If a poor person
cannot borrow to invest in his child, he may choose to compensate by working a
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Figure 2.4: Human Capital Investment for a Model College Student
bit more. Equivalently, if a college student cannot borrow, he may choose to take a
part-time job. Having labor choice in the model reduces the importance of borrowing
constraints. If a college student has no other way of raising money than borrowing,
then borrowing constraints are more likely to be important.
2.6 Calibration
Many of the parameters can be obtained without solving the model. I calibrate 27
model parameters to their empirical counterparts. The remaining 11 parameters are
estimated jointly using an exactly identified simulated method of moments approach.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarize the parameters calibrated outside and inside the model.
The main source of data for the estimated parameters, 6 out of the 11 data moments,
is employed males from the PSID (1999-2005). I use employed males because most of
the literature on intergenerational earnings persistence is based on the relationship
between father and son, and the analysis is carried out on working individuals. In
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addition there is no unemployment in my model. I use the years 1999-2005 because
these are the years for which I also have data on education spending and taxes.
Below I describe the data used in the calibration of each parameter as well as the
estimation approach.
Preferences
The momentary utility function is the standard CRRA utility function in 2.21, with
consumption measured in adult equivalents,
(
c
e(t)
)
. I use the so-called O¨ECD-
modifieda¨dult equivalence scale and set e(t) = 1.3 when there is a child in the
household, and e(t) = 1.0 when there is not. Consistent with a survey of the em-
pirical literature in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999), I set the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, σ, equal to 2, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, η, equal to 3. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and labor,
χ, the time discount factor, δ, and the altruism parameter, α, are among the esti-
mated parameters. The corresponding data moments are average hours worked for
employed males 25-64, asset holdings of employed males 50-54, and asset holdings of
employed males 25-29 in the PSID (1999-2005). Consistent with the American Time
Use Survey (2003), I assume that the day has 15 hours not needed for personal care
and normalize hours so that working 15 hours per day is equivalent to a labor supply
of 1 in the model.
Risk-Free Interest Rate
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, I take the risk-free rate as fixed
and calibrate it using data. I set the risk-free rate equal to the average of 3-month
T-bill rates minus inflation over the period 1947-2008 based on data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.4
4Series TB3MS and GDPDEF
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Table 2.2: Parameters Calibrated Outside of the Model
Parameter Value Description Target
r 0.011 Risk free interest rate (annual) 3-mnth T-bill minus inflation (1947-2008)
σ 2 u(c, n) =
( ce(t))
1−σ
1−σ
− χn
1+η
1+η
Browning et al. (1999)
η 3
e 1.0 or 1.3 OECD-modified equivalence scale.
γ01 0.221 w = hγ0e
γj1x+γ
j
2x
2+γj3x
3+u PSID (1968-1997)
γ02 -0.029
γ03 0.001
γ11 0.295
γ12 -0.052
γ13 0.003
τ1 -0.573 τ(wn) = τ1(wn/AE)
0.2 OECD tax data (2001-2005)
τ2 1.706 +τ2(wn/AE)
0.4 + τ3(wn/AE)
0.6
τ3 -1.096 +τ4(wn/AE)
0.8
τ4 0.221
τc 0.084 Consumption tax Vertex Inc. (2002)
$ 0.110 Time spent studying in college American Time Use Survey
wc $11.14/h Wage rate in college CPS (1999-2005)
Ig(t) Primary: $4522 Public spending per student UNESCO (1999-2005)
Secondary: $5295
Tertiary: $10672
z $24856 College borrowing limit Lochner and Monge-Narajano (2008)
T $13094 Old age Social Security Social Security Administration (1999-2005)
Γ(t) Varies Death probabilities NCHS (1991-2001)
Dollar amounts in annual 2005 dollars.
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Wages
I calibrate the life-cycle profile of wages exogenously, using the entire PSID from
1968-2005. I regress wages on model potential experience and control for the year
of observation. I estimate different experience paths for college graduates and non-
college graduates. For the data moments used in the structural estimation, I use
only the years 1999-2005. I take the average wage of college graduates, the average
wage of high school graduates, and the variance of log wages as the corresponding
data moments to estimate the following parameters: the market return to human
capital, γ0, the starting level of human capital, h0, and the standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic earnings shock, σu. In the PSID, individuals are observed only every
second year from 1999-2005, while they are observed every year until 1997. To get
an estimate of the variance of five-year wages in the time period from 1999-2005, I
assume that the ratio between the variance of five-year and one-year wages in this
time period is the same as it was in the period 1991-1997.
Production of Human Capital/Investment in Education
The corresponding data moments to the parameters of the human capital production
function, ψ0, and ψ1, are private spending on elementary and college education. In
addition I must know public spending per student at each level of education, Ig(t).
I follow Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) and think of education spending by local
governments in primary and secondary education as private spending, while I take
state and federal education spending as public spending. The rationale behind this
is that local government spending is financed by local taxes and that parents, when
they choose which neighborhood to live in, choose the level of local government
education spending. Public schools receive both local and state/federal funding, and
schools in wealthier neighborhoods have larger budgets due to more local funding; see
also Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998). In one way,
counting all local government spending as parental investment in education may be
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Table 2.3: Parameters Estimated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description Data Moment
γ0 0.372 w = hγ0e
γj1x+γ
j
2x
2+γj3x
3+u w¯, skilled workers
h0 0.467 Starting level of human capital w¯, unskilled workers
ψ0 0.300 h
′ = h+ A
(
hI)
ψ0 , before college I¯p, elementary school
ψ1 0.881 h
′ = h+ A
(
hI)
ψ1 , in college I¯s, in college
σu 0.398 u ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν) Std. dev. of log(w)
θ 0.332 log(Ac) = θ log (Ap) + ν β
σv 0.259 ν ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν) College enrollment
Ω -0.427 pi(Ah) = 1− eΩAh College failure rate
α 0.302 Parental altruism k¯, age 25-29
χ 171.2 u(c, n) =
( ce(t))
1−σ
1−σ
− χn
1+η
1+η
n¯,
δ 1.016 Discount factor k¯, age 50-54
a strong assumption that leads to a high level of private education spending relative
to public spending. On the other hand, defining education spending as the only form
of monetary investment that parents make in human capital is very conservative. To
construct the relevant calibration targets for each level of education under the above
assumption, I use data on public expenditure per student as fraction of GDP per
capita from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (1999-2005), and data on private
expenditure as a fraction of total expendiure, as well as local government’s share of
public expenditure from the OECD (1999-2005).
Intergenerational Correlation of Ability
The intergenerational correlation of ability, θ, obviously has an impact on the inter-
generational persistence of earnings, and I use that as the calibration target for this
parameter. I obtain the value of 0.47 for the intergenerational earnings persistence
from a meta study by Corak (2006). This also happens to be the same value as found
by Grawe (2004), the latest study, using data from the PSID.
Time Spent Studying in College, College Enrolment, Failure, and Borrowing
To calibrate the fixed time cost of attending college, $, I use data from the American
Time Use Survey (2004-2008). College students spend, on average, 3.3 hours per
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day on educational activities on weekdays. I assume that they attend two 13-week
semesters per year and that they also study 3.3 hours per day on weekends. While
this may be a bit optimistsic, many students also attend summer school. I use
college enrollment as the data target for the standard deviation of abilities, σν , and
the college failure rate as the target for the parameter Ω, which determines the
probability of failing college. I compute these targets from the fraction of males with
college degrees in the PSID (1999-2005), and data on college survival probability
from the OECD (2000, 2004). I get the college borrowing limit from Lochner and
Monge-Narajano (2008). This is the borrowing limit for the federal loan program
called Stafford loans, which is what most students are eligible for. There is another
loan program called Perkins loans, which can provide further loans to the students
with greatest financial need, but in practice, few students make use of this program.
Below I study the effect of relaxing the borrowing constraint.
Taxes
The labor income tax schedule is a polynomial function of an individual’s earnings
relative to the average earnings, AE:
τ(wn) = τ1
(wn
AE
)0.2
+ τ2
(wn
AE
)0.4
+ τ3
(wn
AE
)0.6
+ τ4
(wn
AE
)0.8
(2.30)
As described in more detail in Appendix 2.10.2 I fit this polynomial to labor income
tax data from the OECD tax database (2001-2005). These data are constructed by
the OECD based on tax laws from different countries. It is well suited for cross-
country comparisons; see also Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009). Coming up
with an accurate estimate of consumption taxes in the US is complicated by the
fact that there are local county-level taxes in addition to state taxes. Vertex Inc.
(a consulting company) estimated that the average consumption tax in the US was
8.4% in 2002. I use that number. For simplicity, I abstract from capital taxes. I
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do this because different types of capital are taxed differently, and this also differs
across countries. Households do, for instance, have about half of their wealth in their
homes, wealth that may or may not be taxed. In the US, interest income is taxed
as labor income, while dividends and capital gains are subject to capital gains tax.
The return on capital is, however, set very conservatively in the calibration. It is set
equal to the return on risk-free bonds, which was 1.1% over the past 60 years.
Death Probabilities and Social Security
I assume that all retirees receive the same constant Social Security benefit. I obtain
the average benefit for males from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social
Security Bulletin (1999-2005). I obtain the probability that a retiree will survive to
the next period from the National Center for Health Statistics (1991-2001).
Estimation Method
Eleven model parameters are calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method
of moments approach. I minimize the squared percentage deviation of simulated
model statistics from the eleven data moments in Table 2.4. Let Σ = {γ0, h0, ψ0, ψ1, σu
, θ, σν ,Ω, α, χ, δ} and let g(Σ) = (g1
(
Σ), ..., g11(Σ)
)′
denote the vector where gi(Σ) =
m¯i−mˆi(Σ)
m¯i
is the percentage difference between empirical moments and simulated mo-
ments. Then:
Σˆ = min
Σ
g(Σ)′g(Σ) (2.31)
Table 2.3 summarizes the estimated parameter values. As can be seen from Table
2.4, I get close to matching all of the moments exactly.5 Because five of the empirical
moments have unknown variance, it is not possible to compute any standard errors
5The reason that the match is not exact is that the objective function which I minimize is not
continuous. Following Tauchen (1986), I approximate the processes for the shocks to ability and
productivity as finite state Markov processes. It turns out that the combination of ability and
productivity shock has a non-negligible impact on the college decision. When the parameters are
changed, almost everyone with the same combination of ability and productivity shock may change
their college decision at the same time. As I increase the number of ability and shock states, the
objective function becomes smoother and the estimation fit improves; however, the computational
time also increases.
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Table 2.4: Estimation Statistics
Statistic Data Model
Mean hours worked 0.417 0.417
Mean wages of workers without college degrees 1.000 1.002
Mean wages of workers with college degrees 1.757 1.757
Std. dev. of log(wage) 0.570 0.571
Investment in elementary school 0.038 0.037
Investment in college 0.121 0.120
Fraction of workers enrolling in college 0.588 0.590
Fraction failing college 0.400 0.399
Intergenerational earnings elasticity 0.470 0.470
Mean assets of people ages 25-29 0.092 0.092
Mean assets of people ages 50-54 0.525 0.525
in this exercise. I set the intergenerational persistence of earnings equal to 0.47 based
on the meta study by Corak (2006). The moments on investment in early and college
education are based on aggregate data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
2.7 Decomposing Earnings Persistence
There are four main model elements that govern earnings persistence: the process
by which abilities are inherited, the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
inter vivos transfers from parent to child, and investments in human capital. Human
capital investments are made by parents (individuals in college) and the government.
Parental/individual investments and inter vivos transfers will be affected by the size
of the government investment, returns to human capital investments, taxation, and
borrowing constraints. To quantify how the different model elements affect earnings
persistence, I shut them down and reintroduce them in the model one by one. We
cannot set human capital investments to zero because everyone would get a zero
wage, so we will keep government investments constant, relative to average earnings
in the economy, and set parental investments to zero, inter vivos transfers to zero,
the correlation of abilities to zero, and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock to zero.
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Table 2.5: Earnings Persistence with Different Model Elements Present
Earnings Correlated Idiosyncratic Private Inter vivos
persistence abilities shocks investments transfers
0.002
0.314 X
0.000 X
0.256 X
-0.017 X
0.180 X X
0.510 X X
0.304 X X
0.222 X X
-0.030 X X
0.249 X X
0.428 X X X
0.180 X X X
0.544 X X X
0.215 X X X
0.470 X X X X
Then we will start reintroducing these elements in the model; see Table 2.5. I also
keep the variance of the shocks to the log of abilities, σν , constant in this exercise.
The main conclusion from Table 2.5 is that both parental/individual investments
and correlation of abilities make significant positive contributions to intergenerational
earnings persistence. The link between earnings persistence and private human cap-
ital investments comes from the fact that the optimal parental/individual human
capital investment policy functions are usually upward sloping in financial resources;
the exception is for very wealthy individuals.6 The intergenerational earnings elastic-
ity falls to approximately zero when all four model elements are left out. The reason
it is not exactly zero is that I approximate the continuous AR(1)-process for abilities
by finite state Markov processes, as proposed by Tauchen (1986), when simulating
the model.7 This leads to slight inaccuracies, which become smaller as one increases
the number of states. Introducing correlated abilities leads to an intergenerational
6Figure 2.4 displays an example investment policy function for a model college student. In the
simulated model, almost all individuals would be on the upward sloping part of the graph.
7See Appendix 2.10.4 for details on computation.
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earnings elasticity of 0.314. One might have expected it to be equal to the correla-
tion of the log of abilities, 0.332, but there is a nonlinear relationship between ability
and earnings. Having parental/individual investments alone in the model gives an
earnings elasticity of 0.256.
When all model elements are present, the effect of leaving out inter vivos transfers
is to reduce the intergenerational earnings elasticity from 0.47 to 0.428. Inter vivos
transfers affect intergenerational earnings persistence in three ways. The absence of
transfers limits the ability of children with rich parents to invest in college education,
and this would negatively impact earnings persistence. Another effect is that if there
are no inter vivos transfers, the only way a wealthy parent with a low ability child
can help the child is to invest more in human capital. This will reduce the dispersion
of investments and reduce earnings persistence. However, introducing inter vivos
transfers alone in the model yields a negative intergenerational earnings elasticity.
This is because of the negative income effect on labor supply. Children of high earners
get larger transfers and work less, which causes a negative correlation between the
earnings of parents and children.
With all elements present in the model, removing the idiosyncratic shocks causes
the intergenerational earnings elasticity to increase from 0.47 to 0.544. The effect of
introducing idiosyncratic wage shocks in the model is generally to reduce earnings
persistence. This is because the shocks are random and not correlated across genera-
tions, like abilities and investments in human capital. However, there is an exception
when only inter vivos transfers are present in the model. Introducing shocks that are
log-normally distributed around zero has the effect of making the society richer and
causing parents to give larger transfers. In the case with only inter vivos transfers
present, larger transfers lead to a stronger negative correlation between the earnings
of parents and children.
The case when all model elements are present except private investments in hu-
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man capital is particularly interesting. The intergenerational earnings elasticity is
then 0.184, or about the same as in Scandinavian countries. In the context of the
present model, we would need policy reforms that completely eliminate all private
human capital investments to reach the same earnings persistence as in Scandinavia.
This may imply that factors other than just policy impact cross-country differences
in earnings persistence. Some of these factors may be captured by the correlation of
abilities/family endowments. However, one shortcoming of the present model is that
there is no explicit modeling of the supply of educational service. It may be realistic
to assume that the human capital production function would change as the demand
for education changes, and that this would impact the results.
2.8 Policy Experiments
In Section 2.2, I documented a strong cross-country correlation between intergen-
erational earnings persistence and tax progressivity and intergenerational earnings
persistence and public spending on tertiary education. This motivates the study, in
this section, of the contributions of differences in country policies to differences in
earnings persistence. I also study the impact of relaxing and tightening the borrow-
ing constraints. When I perform the policy experiments, I keep public education
expenditure and taxes as functions of average earnings in the economy. In this way
if the society becomes richer or poorer because of a policy change, education expen-
diture and taxes will adjust accordingly. Since there is no public good in the model,
I do not keep a balanced government budget and excess tax revenues are assumed
to finance bureaucracy.8
8In Appendix 2.10.6, I relax this assumption in the sense that when I perform the policy ex-
periments I redistribute the net change in tax revenues relative to the benchmark model evenly to
all households. Redistribution does not have a large impact on the results with respect to inter-
generational earnings persistence. It does, however, have a significant impact on labor supply and
therefore on average earnings.
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Table 2.6: Policy Experiments
Statistic Bench- Danish Danish Danish Tax w.
mark taxes educ. subsidies US level,
subsidies + taxes Dan. prg.
Average hours worked 0.417 0.446 0.408 0.440 0.413
Std. dev. of log wages 0.571 0.499 0.632 0.550 0.520
Fraction enrolling in college 0.590 0.511 0.890 0.832 0.507
Intergen. earnings elasticity 0.470 0.350 0.434 0.351 0.423
Average human capital inv. age 5-9 $3998 $868 $5710 $1547 $2287
Average human capital inv. age 10-14 $5127 $1310 $7165 $2144 $3002
Average human capital inv. age 14-19 $5752 $1492 $5055 $864 $3337
Average human capital inv. in college $14692 $1780 $13513 $1881 $6070
Average human capital inv. (all ages) $5016 $1041 $6200 $1288 $2596
Average gift from parent to child $78714 $10333 $128269 $21193 $26581
tax per worker − educ. expenditure
benchmark average earnings
0.343 0.546 0.379 0.599 0.318
Average Earnings $61111 $53489 $71474 $60883 $53539
I¯private
I¯total
0.525 0.215 0.417 0.156 0.403
Stdev
(
Iprivate−I¯private
I¯private
)
2.240 2.033 2.250 2.234 2.033
Corr
(
college, log (yparent)
)
0.1939 0.1367 0.1572 0.1412 0.1705
Column 2 displays the results when introducing a Danish tax system into the model. Column 3 shows
the resultswhen introducing Danish public education expenditure policies. Column 4 shows the
results when introducing Danish taxes and education spending at the same time. Column 5 displays
the results from introducing a tax system with the US average tax rate but with Danish progressivity.
The dollar amounts are in annual 2005 dollars.
The Impact of Taxation and Public Education Expenditure
Out of the countries in Table 2.1, Denmark has the highest and most progressive
taxes and they spend the most on tertiary education (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
Denmark is also the country with the lowest earnings persistence. I therefore study
how earnings persistence in my model economy, which is calibrated to US data,
changes as I introduce Danish policies. I think of the change in earnings persistence
due to the introduction of Danish policies as being in the upper range of how much of
cross-country differences can be explained by policies, since the effect of introducing
policies from any other country will be smaller. Table 2.6 displays how selected
model statistics change in the policy experiments.
As can be seen from row 4 of Table 2.6, the greatest reduction in intergenera-
tional earnings persistence comes from introducing a Danish tax system in the US.
Introducing a Danish tax system in the US reduces the intergenerational earnings
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elasticity by 12 percentage points, to 0.35, or about 40% of the difference between the
US and the Scandinavian countries; see Table 2.1. The higher and more progressive
taxes greatly reduce the incentives for private investment in education, and this leads
to lower earnings persistence. We observe that higher and more progressive taxes
also lead to lower college enrollment and less cross-sectional inequality. A higher
tax level has the effect of reducing the levels of private investments and private in-
vestments’ share of total investments falls. Thus for a given percentage increase in
private investments, the percentage increase in total investments is smaller. This
weakens the relationship between the parents financial resources and the childs earn-
ings and leads to lower earnings persistence. The effect of more progressive taxes is
to disproportionally reduce the incentives for human capital investments for wealthy
and/or high-ability individuals. This compresses the distribution of private human
capital investments and leads to lower intergenerational earnings persistence.
To investigate the quantitative impact of tax progressivity versus tax levels on
earnings persistence, I impose a tax system with the same average labor income tax
rate as in the US but with the same progressivity as in Denmark, as measured by
2.2.9 The right column of Table 2.6 displays the results from this experiment. The
intergenerational persistence of earnings is now 0.423. We can interpret this as if
about 40% of the difference in earnings persistence between the benchmark economy
and the economy with a Danish tax system is due to increased tax progressivity
and about 60% is due to the increased tax level. We observe that the percentage
variation in private human capital investments is the same in the experiment with
Danish taxes and in the experiment with US tax levels and Danish tax progressivity.
The difference in earnings persistence between the two experiments is due to the
level of private investments relative to public investments.
Introducing a Danish public education expenditure scheme lowers the intergen-
9See Appendix 2.10.5 for details.
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Table 2.7: Public Education Expenditure Per Student as % of GDP Per Capita
Education level US Denmark
Primary 11.1 9.6
Secondary 13.0 19.5
Tertiary 26.3 0.671
Based on data from UNESCO (1999-2005) and OECD (1999-2005)
erational earnings elasticity by 3.6 percentage points, to 0.434. This is explained by
increased public expenditure reducing the incentives for parental/individual expen-
diture on education in relative terms. Total private education expenditure actually
increases in absolute terms but this is because the society has became richer, and av-
erage earnings have increased by about 17%. Private education expenditure’s share
of total education expenditure does, however, fall from 53% to 42%.
Secondary and tertiary private education spending decreases with Danish pub-
lic expenditure, while private spending on elementary education increases. This is
because the Danish public investments are very large for tertiary and secondary ed-
ucation (see Table 2.7) and at about the same level as in the US for elementary
education. Therefore, parents move their investments from late to early education.
Not surprisingly, greatly increasing public expenditure in tertiary education increases
college enrollment. The correlation between college completion and parental earnings
decreases.
Introducing both Danish public education expenditure and taxation at the same
time actually increases earnings persistence by 0.01 percentage point, to 0.351, rel-
ative to the case with just a Danish tax. There are several competing effects here.
On the one hand, private investment in education has become smaller relative to
public investment and this should lead to lower earnings persistence, all else being
equal. On the other hand, we observe that there has been an increase in the percent-
age variation in private investments in education. When public education spending
increases, more people go to college and the private investment pattern changes.
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Another effect pointing in the direction of higher earnings persistence is that the
society has become richer, and therefore, people invest more in human capital, in
addition to the government investing more. When total human capital investments
increase, human capital becomes more important for the log of earnings relative to
the idiosyncratic shocks.
It is interesting to note that in the experiment with Danish taxes and public edu-
cation expenditure, average earnings are approximately the same as in the benchmark
economy, as public human capital investments have taken on the role of private in-
vestments. The average gift from parent to child does, however, drop from $78,714
in the benchmark model to $21,193 in the model with Danish taxes and public edu-
cation expenditure. A large part of the incentives to give the child a transfer lies in
the increased earnings from investment in college. When the incentives for investing
in college are reduced, the transfers from parents to children are also reduced.
We conclude that tax and education spending policies significantly impact earn-
ings persistence. Taxation is quantitatively most important. Whether having low
earnings persistence in the society is good or bad is naturally a different question.
More high/progressive taxation as a stand-alone policy reduces human capital accu-
mulation and leads to a poorer society, while increased public education expenditure
has the opposite effect. Higher taxes may, however, be needed to finance education
expenditure. When I introduced Danish education spending, the net change in tax
revenues was actually positive. However, the society became richer, and the gov-
ernment only increased its spending on education. I did, for instance, let the Social
Security payments stay at their old level. Yet another issue is, of course, general
equilibrium effects. I will leave the study of optimal policies to future research.
The Impact of Borrowing Constraints
The importance of borrowing constraints both for intergenerational earnings persis-
tence and college enrollment has received much attention in the literature. In this
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section, I study the effect of tightening and relaxing the college borrowing constraint,
as well as relaxing the assumption that borrowing is allowed only if one attends col-
lege. Finally, I allow for negative inter vivos transfers; that is, the parents can pass
on debt to their children. Table 2.8 displays the results from these experiments.
As can be seen from Table 2.8, relatively large changes to the borrowing constraint
have relatively little impact on intergenerational earnings persistence. Completely
eliminating borrowing for college reduces college enrollment by 18% and college com-
pletion by 14%; however, it is those who have the least to gain from college who drop
out. Average earnings in the economy fall only by 1.7%, and intergenerational earn-
ings persistence rises only by 0.4 percentage point. Letting people borrow more has
little impact both on earnings persistence and on college enrollment. Human capital
investments in college increase slightly and average earnings increase slightly when
more borrowing is allowed. The obvious reason that relaxing the borrowing con-
straint has little effect on earnings persistence is simply that most individuals are
not borrowing constrained from investing in human capital. Most individuals begin
to accumulate positive asset holdings at a young age to save for retirement and for
their children’s college education. Thus, there are no binding constraints stopping
them from investing more in human capital. It does, however, turn out that in the
benchmark economy, the college borrowing constraint binds for about 30% of those
who complete college. However, because it is also possible to work in college, tight-
ening the borrowing constraint will not necessarily lead to large changes in human
capital investments. Individuals in college can compensate by working more.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.8 display the results from experiments in which ev-
eryone, not just those who attend college, can borrow up to twice the original college
borrowing constraint in all time periods prior to retirement. In column 5, parents are
also allowed to give their children negative inter vivos transfers. Allowing for bor-
rowing against children’s earnings leads to a very slight increase in intergenerational
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Table 2.8: The Impact of Borrowing Constraints
Statistic Bench- 0X BC 2X BC 2X BC w. Negative
mark o. college transfers
Fraction enrolling in college 0.590 0.483 0.619 0.611 0.418
Fraction completing college 0.355 0.306 0.371 0.368 0.262
Intergen. earnings elasticity 0.470 0.474 0.466 0.468 0.472
Average human capital inv. in college $14692 $14914 $16874 $16715 $17819
Average gift from parent to child $78714 $77168 $86709 $84367 $31390
Average Earnings $61111 $60068 $63143 $62916 $60962
Columns 2 and 3 display the results when setting the college borrowing constraint to 0 and doubling
the college borrowing constraint, to $49,712. The college borrowing constraint is linearly decreasing
between college and retirement. Column 4 displays the results when people that do not attend college
are also allowed to borrow up to twice the original college borrowing constraint, or $49,712, in all
time periods before retirement. Column 5 displays the results when the borrowing constraint
is 2 times the original college borrowing constraint in all time periods prior to retirement and
parents are allowed to pass on debt to their children.
earnings elasticity, from 0.468 to 0.472, relative to the experiment in column 4 with
identical borrowing constraints for parents but only positive transfers to children
allowed. Allowing parents to pass on debt to their children is bad for children with
poor parents. Many parents choose to borrow toward their children’s earnings. The
loan is not used for human capital investments but is rather added to the parents’
retirement savings. This leads to a society in which the average holdings of capital
are lower and the average transfer from parent to child falls by about $53,000 rela-
tive to the experiment in column 4 with identical borrowing constraints for parents
but only positive transfers to children allowed. There is a significant drop in college
enrollment; however, average earnings decrease only slightly. It is those who would
get marginal gains from college who drop out, and those who have large gains from
college are able to invest almost the same amount as before. The average human
capital investment in college actually increases, but this is because college completion
is lower and those who drop out were investing little.
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2.9 Conclusion
In this paper I develop an intergenerational life-cycle model of human capital accu-
mulation and earnings, which features taxation, public education expenditure, bor-
rowing constraints, partially inheritable abilities, inter vivos transfers from parent to
child, and idiosyncratic wage shocks as determinants of intergenerational earnings
persistence. I calibrate the model to US data and use it to quantify how earnings per-
sistence in the US changes as I introduce policies from Denmark. I find that taxation
and public education expenditure have a significant impact on earnings persistence
and are likely contributors to the cross-country patterns that empirical researchers
have found. Taxation is quantitatively most important. As I introduce a Danish
tax system in the US, intergenerational earnings elasticity falls from 0.47 to 0.35, or
about 40% of the difference between the US and the Scandinavian countries, which
have the lowest earnings persistence among the countries in my sample. I also find
that borrowing constraints have a very limited impact on earnings persistence.
Future research in this area may include the study of optimal education expendi-
ture and tax policies within an intergenerational general equilibrium framework. An
extension is also to explicitly model the supply of educational services. In this paper
I have assumed that the technology for human capital production stays the same as
the demand for education changes.
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Discussion of Difficulties with Comparing Different
Studies of Earnings Persistence
There are some difficulties related to comparing different studies of intergenerational
earnings persistence. Solon (1992) and Blanden (2009) provide more in-depth dis-
cussions of some of the methodological issues. One problem in the estimation of 2.1
is the measure of earnings. Ideally the measure of earnings used in 2.1 should be
permanent or lifetime earnings. Since this measure is rarely available, the econo-
metrician will either use earnings observed in a single year or preferably take the
average of several years of earnings. This will generally be an inaccurate measure of
permanent earnings. It is easy to show that an inaccurate measure of the father’s
earnings in 2.1 will lead the estimate of β to be biased downward. A first step to-
ward reducing this measurement error is controlling for age in 2.1, and this is done
in pretty much every study. However, if more years of earnings are averaged, the
measurement error is reduced, and this is a source of discrepancies between different
studies. Another obvious source of discrepancies between studies is the quality of the
data. If the sample is too homogeneous, i.e., the variance of earnings is too small, as
is typical for unrepresentative data samples, the problem with measurement error is
compounded; see Solon (1992).
A possible solution to the problem with measurement error in the father’s earnings
is the use of instrumental variables. The instruments must be uncorrelated with the
measurement error and, in addition, uncorrelated to the son’s earnings. The problem
with the instrumental variable approach is that most variables related to father’s
earnings may also have an independent impact on the son’s earnings. Solon (1992)
shows that in this case, the estimate of β will be biased upward. The instrumental
variables approach is nonetheless becoming more popular in the literature.
46
Finally, the age at which father’s and son’s earnings are observed may have a
substantial impact on the estimates of β; see Haider and Solon (2006) and Grawe
(2003). Controlling for age in the regression does not solve this problem, since high
and low earners have different life-cycle earnings profiles. Often the earnings of young
sons are regressed on the earnings of old fathers, which is found to cause a downward
bias in the estimate of β. Haider and Solon (2006) find that the years around 40 will
be the best proxies for lifetime earnings.
Corak (2006) provides a cross-country meta study of intergenerational earnings
persistence that tries to take into account how many years of the father’s earnings
were used as a measure for permanent earnings, whether an IV approach was used,
and the age of the father at the time of observation. Table 2.1 displays the results
from this study supplemented with earnings persistence from Italy and Spain, which
I take from Piraino (2007) and Pla (2009). I adjust the number for Italy using a
formula provided in Corak (2006). I cannot do the same for Spain, because I do not
know the average age of the fathers in that study. Given the many problems with
comparing different studies of intergenerational earnings persistence, it is clear that
Table 2.1 should be interpreted as a stylized fact.
2.10.2 Fitting Tax Functions Based on Data from the OECD
For every country in Table 2.1, I fit the polynomial in 2.30. I use this functional
form because it generally gives me a very good fit, R2 above 99.9%, and because I
get functions that are strictly increasing and well behaved on a relatively wide range
of labor income. I use labor income tax data from the OECD tax-benefit calculator10
and the OECD tax database11. These data are constructed by the OECD based on
tax laws from different countries.
The OECD tax-benefit calculator gives the gross- and net (after taxes and ben-
10Available at: www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39717906_1_1_1_1,00.html.
11Available at: www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html.
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Figure 2.5: Labor Income Tax Functions for the US and Denmark
efits) labor income at every percentage of average labor income on a range between
50% and 200% of average labor income, by year and family type starting in 2001. I
use the data at every fifth percentage point for single individuals without children
and take an average of the years 2001-2005. The OECD tax catabase provides the
top marginal tax rate in each country and the starting point for this tax rate. To get
the tax at earnings above 200% of average labor income, I use this information and
compute the tax at every multiple of 0.5 times average earnings between 2.5 and 15
times average earnings. For most countries the top marginal tax rate kicks in before
200% of average labor income, but in the US, for instance, the top marginal tax rate
starts at about 9 times average earnings. I then assume that the marginal tax rate
increases linearly between 2 times average earnings and the point at which the top
marginal tax rate becomes effective.
Since I only have tax data starting at 50% of average earnings, I add a random
positive point of close to zero tax for close to zero earnings, to get my tax functions
well behaved for very small earnings. This, however, has almost no impact on the
fit with the real data points. The alternative would have have been to require all
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Table 2.9: Country Tax Functions
Country τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 R
2
Denmark -1.242825 3.603493 -2.456365 0.5239973 0.9997
Norway -0.6488133 1.818972 -1.023706 0.1670745 0.9999
Finland -0.71829 1.895892 -1.004558 0.1465101 0.9996
Canada -0.3056732 0.8059581 -0.2546371 -0.0145851 0.9997
Sweden -0.6629891 1.966373 -1.183786 0.2152142 0.9997
Germany -1.329006 4.017692 -2.947534 0.6809511 0.9998
Spain -0.2001187 0.3728243 0.1407691 -0.1200151 0.9994
France -0.5460613 1.651868 -1.011427 0.1903222 0.9998
Italy -0.7060691 1.782236 -0.9431628 0.137171 0.9989
USA -0.5730303 1.705866 -1.096482 0.2207298 0.9998
UK -0.5907906 1.778369 -1.163281 0.2362276 0.9998
people to work enough to make a certain amount of income. I fit the tax functions by
running OLS regressions. Table 2.9 displays the country tax functions, while Figure
2.5 plots the tax functions for the US and Denmark.
2.10.3 Proof of Propositions 2.3.1 and 2.3.1
Proposition 2.3.1
Since log (yt) is a monotonic transformation of yt, it will be sufficient to take the
derivatives of the top part of 2.11 with respect to yt. We have:
∂ log (yt+1)
∂yt
=
ψ(1− τ)
yt(1− τ) + Ig
> 0 (2.32)
∂2 log (yt+1)
∂yt∂τ
=
−ψIg(
yt(1− τ) + Ig
)2 < 0 (2.33)
∂2 log (yt+1)
∂yt∂Ig
=
−ψ(1− τ)(
yt(1− τ) + Ig
)2 < 0 (2.34)
∂2 log (yt+1)
∂yt∂ψ
=
yt(1− τ)
2 + Ig(1− τ)(
yt(1− τ) + Ig
)2 > 0 (2.35)

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Proposition 2.3.2
Differentiating 2.16, we obtain:
∂β
∂τ
=
−ψ(1− θ2)I˜g(
(1 + ψθ)(1− τ) + I˜g
)2 < 0 (2.36)
∂β
∂I˜g
=
−ψ(1− θ2)(1− τ)(
(1 + ψθ)(1− τ) + I˜g
)2 < 0 (2.37)
∂β
∂ψ
=
(1− θ2)(1− τ)2 + (1− ψθ − θ2)(1− τ)I˜g(
(1 + ψθ)(1− τ) + I˜g
)2 > 0 (2.38)
∂β
∂θ
=
(1− ψ2)(1− τ)2 + 2(1− τ)I˜g + I˜
2
g(
(1 + ψθ)(1− τ) + I˜g
)2 > 0 (2.39)

2.10.4 Computational Details
Computation of Optimal Policies
I put boundaries on the capital and human capital space and pick a grid in each
dimension. I pick 40 grid points in K = [kmin, kmax] and 16 grid points in H =
[hmin, hmax]. The grid points for capital are taken to be the scaled zeros of a 40th or-
der Chebyshev polynomial ,while the grid points for human capital are taken to be the
scaled zeros of a 16th order Chebyshev polynomial. Following the method outlined
by Tauchen (1986), I approximate the processes for the idiosyncratic productivity
shock, u, and ability, A, as finite state Markov processes. I use 7 equally spaced states
for u in U = [−2σu, 2σu], and 13 equally spaced states for A in A¯ = [−3σA, 3σA].
Let J = {0, 1} be the state space for whether an individual is college educated. The
maximum size of the state space occurs in periods 5-7, or ages 40-50, when there are
6 state variables apart from time. The state space is then J×K×H×H× A¯×U , or
1,863,680 grid points. I compute the household’s optimal policies for each grid point
in each time period by iterating backwards. I start from age 100, the last period
of life. In that period, the next period’s value function is 0, and the optimal policy
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is to consume as much as possible. Knowing the value function at age 100, I can
compute optimal policies and value functions for age 95, and so on. Reaching age
50, when the child leaves home, I need to know both the parent’s value function at
age 55 and the child’s value function at age 20 to compute the optimal policies. The
first time around, I use an educated guess for the child’s value function at age 20.
When I reach age 20, I get a new V (age = 20, ·) and start over again from age 50. I
continue this iteration until V converges.
To solve for the optimal policies in each time period, I use the routine called
LCONF from the IMSL Fortran library. It is based on M. Powell’s method for solving
linearly constrained optimization problems; see IMSL documentation for details. To
interpolate the value function outside of the grid, I use Chebyshev collocation; see
Judd (1998), Heer and Maussner (2004). When there is a child in the household and
the parent is investing in the child’s human capital, the next period’s value function
must be interpolated in the K × H-space. The value function is then represented
as a polynomial with 40 X 16 = 640 coefficients. At one point in time, when the
agent chooses whether or not to attend college, I am taking the max of two value
functions. When these two value functions overlap, the value function considered by
the parent, before the child makes the college decision, will generally not be concave.
However, what the parent needs to consider is the expectation of the value function
over the idiosyncratic shock. It turns out that the expectation of the value function
is concave, although there is no theoretical guarantee for it. To be absolutely sure
that I am finding a global max, I am multi starting the solver from points that are
far apart.
Simulation
Knowing today’s state, the policy functions, and drawing shocks, u and ν, I can find
the next period’s state. I make 200,000 draws from a random initial distribution of
20 year olds and run the simulation for 200 generations (enough to reach a stationary
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distribution). In the simulation, the policy functions must be interpolated on the
K×H×H-space as both the child’s and the parent’s human capital may be outside
of the grid. I use linear interpolation.
Hardware and Software
I use Intel Fortran, version 11.1 and a computer with a 2.93 GHz Core-i7 processor.
To speed up the computation, I use OpenMP to parallelize the code on the 8 threads.
2.10.5 Introducing a Tax System with US Level and Danish
Progressivity
We want to introduce a new tax function, τ˜(y), which has the same average tax rate
as in the US but where progressivity, as defined in 2.2, is the same as the tax system
in Denmark, τD(y). We must have:
1−
1− τ˜(y2)
1− τ˜(y1)
= 1−
1− τD(y2)
1− τD(y1)
⇒
1− τ˜(y2)
1− τD(y2)
=
1− τ˜(y1)
1− τD(y1)
(2.40)
for all levels of y1 and y2. Letting the fraction
1−τ˜(y)
1−τD(y)
be equal to a constant, Λ, for
all levels of y, we can obtain a new tax system with the desired properties as follows:
1− τ˜(y) = Λ
(
1− τD(y)
)
⇒ τ˜(y) = 1− Λ + ΛτD(y) (2.41)
We must solve for Λ in the context of the model to obtain the same average tax level
as in the US.
2.10.6 Policy Experiments With Redistribution of Net Changes
in Tax Revenues
Below I reproduce the first 4 columns of Table 6 but this time I redistribute the net
change in tax revenues relative to the benchmark model evenly to all households.
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Table 2.10: Policy Experiments with Redistribution of ∆ Tax Revenue
Statistic Bench- Danish Danish Danish
mark taxes educ. subsidies
subsidies + taxes
Average hours worked 0.417 0.391 0.403 0.383
Std. dev. of log wages 0.571 0.491 0.628 0.533
Fraction enrolling in college 0.590 0.418 0.889 0.739
Intergen. earnings elasticity 0.470 0.347 0.437 0.357
Average human capital inv. age 5-9 $3998 $631 $5501 $1072
Average human capital inv. age 10-14 $5127 $957 $6900 $1493
Average human capital inv. age 14-19 $5752 $1042 $4837 $533
Average human capital inv. in college $14692 $1570 $12754 $987
Average human capital inv. (all ages) $5016 $750 $5920 $869
Average gift from parent to child $78714 $4409 $118617 $8052
tax per worker − educ. expenditure
benchmark average earnings
0.343 0.507 0.371 0.543
Average Earnings $61111 $45265 $69554 $49448
I¯private
I¯total
0.525 0.193 0.413 0.138
Stdev
(
Iprivate−I¯private
I¯private
)
2.240 2.118 2.263 2.202
Corr
(
college, log (yparent)
)
0.1939 0.153 0.156 0.155
Column 2 displays the results when introducing a Danish tax system into the model.
Column 3 shows the results when introducing Danish public education expenditure policies.
Column 4 shows the results when introducing Danish taxes and education spending at the
same time. The dollar amounts are in annual 2005 dollars.
Redistribution does not have a large impact on the results with respect to intergen-
erational earnings persistence. It does, however, greatly reduce labor supply and
average earnings. The reduction in labor supply is the reason for why redistribution
does not have a larger impact on earnings persistence. On one hand poorer house-
holds get more financial resources that could be invested in education but on the
other hand poorer households tend to reduce their labor supply the most in response
to the redistribution. this reduces their incentives to invest in education.
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Chapter 3
Marriage Stability, Taxation and
Aggregate Labor Supply in the US
vs. Europe
3.1 Introduction
It is a well-known empirical finding that aggregate labor supply is higher in the
United States than in Europe and that there is also substantial variation among
European countries, see for instance Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006). Rogerson
(2006) notes that these differences are an order of magnitude larger than the fluctu-
ations at business cycle frequencies in post-WWII US data, and thus deserve serious
attention. Are the differences in hours worked due to public policies or are they due
to other fundamental differences between societies?
In this paper, we start by using micro level data to document the contribution
of various demographic groups to the aggregate differences between the US and 8
European countries. We find that among the demographic groups that we consider,
the largest contribution comes from women – in most European countries, women
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work substantially less than in the United States, while the difference in hours worked
between European and American men is smaller, and in some cases practically non-
existent. This is especially true for married women, but also holds for single women,
and for women with and without children. We also document a negative cross-
country correlation between tax level and labor supply, and a positive correlation
between divorce rates and labor supply across countries and across time. Divorce
rates are, however, in particular correlated with female labor supply. Motivated
by these observations, we consider the following two potential driving forces for
cross-country differences in labor supply: 1) cross-country differences in taxation; 2)
cross-country differences in marriage stability.
To quantitatively assess the impact of taxes and marriage stability on labor supply
we develop a life-cycle, overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous agents,
marriage, and divorce. There are three types of households; single males, single
females and married households. Divorces and marriages occur stochastically. The
main channel through which individual divorce and singlehood rates impact labor
supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and thereby providing
incentives for individuals to invest in experience accumulation. We calibrate our
model to US data and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce
divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from other countries. We find
that the effect of making marriages more stable is a reduction in labor supply. This
effect is particularly strong for female labor supply, because the woman is usually
the lower earner in a married couple. Changing the US probabilities of marriage and
divorce to their European equivalents accounts on average for 22% of the difference
in hours worked between the US and 11 European countries. When we introduce
European taxes and redistribute the increase in taxes evenly to all households, we can
account for 19% of the difference in hours worked between the US and the average
of the European countries. If the increased tax revenues from European taxation is
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not redistributed the average effect is an increase in labor supply. When using both
the divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from the European countries,
the model can on average account for 28% of the difference in hour worked between
the US and Europe.
Cross-Country Differences in Labor Supply: Possible Explanations and Previous Lit-
erature
The economic literature has proposed several potential explanations for the observed
cross-country differences in aggregate labor supply. Taxes have been suggested as a
major contributor to the differences in labor supply by Prescott (2004) and Rogerson
(2006), who used an infinite horizon, representative agent model to evaluate the
impact of differences in average tax rates. We extend this argument, and use a life-
cycle model with heterogeneous agents, who accumulate labor market experience,
and reside in one- and two person households. This allows us to capture several
dimensions of tax systems that cannot be captured in a representative agent model.
We fit nonlinear income tax schedules that can capture the impact of both tax levels
and tax progressivity on aggregate labor supply, as well as one the labor supply
of various demographic groups. We are also able to capture the impact of joint
versus separate taxation of married couples. As pointed out by Guner, Kaygusuz,
and Ventura (2008), separate taxation of married couples leads to a lower marginal
tax rate on the secondary earner in a couple, and therefore encourages female labor
supply. In Section 3.7, we find this to be an important effect in our model.
To the best of our knowledge, the role of differences in marriage stability in ac-
counting for cross-country differences in labor supply has not been analyzed in the
literature. Yet, our finding in Section 3.2 below that the biggest contribution to the
cross-cross country differences in average hours worked comes from women, and in
particular from prime-aged married women, suggests that one may need to pay at-
tention to the cross-country differences in family dynamics. There is ample anecdotal
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evidence that compared to the US, marriages are more stable in Europe, especially
in “catholic” European countries such as Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Greece where
divorces have traditionally carried more social stigma with them. Our hypothesis is
that more stable marriages provide implicit income and consumption insurance to
the spouse who is not the main income earner in the family (the role that for various
reasons is traditionally played by the wife), thus giving her/him less incentive to
accumulate market experience.
One may argue that divorce and marriage decisions are also affected by economic
conditions and that therefore we should make them endogenous choices. However,
then we would need a systematic cross-country pattern in economic conditions that
could account for both the pattern in divorce rates and in labor supply at the same
time. This type of condition could be for instance cross-country differences in the
gender wage gap, in the female return to labor market experience, or in the cost of
having children. These explanations have been proposed in the literature trying to
explain changes in female labor supply over time, see for instance Olivetti (2006)
and Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008). However, we have not been able
to document a cross-country pattern in the gender wage gap or in the female return
to labor market experience that would help us explain the observed patterns in
aggregate labor supply and divorce rates. In Section 3.2, we argue that children
are unlikely to be an important explanation, as the cross country differences in labor
supply is not more pronounced for women with children. We therefore choose to study
the economic implications of exogenous differences in marriage and divorce rates
caused by ”cultural” and/or legal factors. Crouch and Beaulieu (2006) documents
a correlation between different types of divorce laws and divorce rates in the US
and 22 European countries. Generally divorce laws are stricter in Europe. For
instance, they require a longer waiting period before a divorce can be obtained.
Johnson and Skinner (1986) provides empirical support to our theory about the
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impact of exogenous changes in the probability of divorces on female labor supply.
They estimate a simultaneous model of future divorce probability and current labor
supply using US data, and conclude that their results support the hypothesis that
higher divorce probabilities increase labor supply, while the reverse effect appears
insignificant. Stevenson (2008) documents that the US states who adopted unilateral
divorce in the 1970s experienced a spike in female labor supply compared to states
who did not.
One pronounced difference between the US labor market and those in many
European countries is the more rigid regulations and laws in Europe, often referred
to in the literature as labor market frictions. These are possible contributors to
the higher observed unemployment rates and lower labor force participation rates
in Europe. Unions are also much more common in Europe. Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote (2005) argues that regulations and unionization are more like explanations
than taxes. We believe that they could also be contributing factors and that we
should not hope for taxes and divorce rates to explain all of the cross country variation
in labor supply. Out of all the above proposed explanations, however, differences in
divorce rates stand out as a promising candidate for explaining why cross country
differences is mainly driven by female labor supply.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we study the
contributions of different demographic groups to aggregate differences in labor supply
between the US and 8 European countries. In section 3.3, we document a correla-
tion between aggregate labor supply and taxation across countries and a correlation
between aggregate labor supply and divorce rates across time and place. Section IV
studies the impact of divorce rates on labor supply in a simple model. Section 3.5 de-
velops the quantitative model. Section 3.6 discusses data and calibration. In Section
3.7, we study the quantitative implications from changing the US divorce and mar-
riage probabilities to their European counterparts and from introducing European
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tax schemes in the US. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Which Demographics Groups Contribute
to Differences in Aggregate Labor Supply: US
vs. Europe
In this section, we use data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the OECD
Employment Database to analyze the contribution of various demographic groups to
cross-country differences in aggregate labor supply. We find that women is the biggest
contributor to the cross-country differences in labor supply. American women
work more than European women, whether it is single women, married women,
women with and without children. The contribution of women is the largest in
Spain, Italy, Greece and Ireland – the countries where, as we document in the next
section, marriages tend to be more stable.
Next, we analyze the importance of the intensive and extensive margins in ac-
counting for the cross-country differences in labor supply, and find that they are
both important. However, the extensive margin is particularly important for Spain,
Italy, Greece and Ireland (coincidentally, these are the countries where the contribu-
tion of women is also particularly large), while the intensive margin is particularly
important in Germany and Netherlands.
Data Description
The LIS database that we use contains micro-level data from the United States and a
large number of European countries. The advantage of using this database is that the
LIS team harmonizes and standardizes the micro data from the different countries’
surveys in order to facilitate comparative research.
The LIS database provides information about individual hours worked per week
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Table 3.1: Annual Hours Worked, all Persons 15-64 Years of Age, 2000
Country Annual Hours, % of the US, Number of obs, Annual Hours, % of the US,
LIS LIS LIS OECD OECD
US 1375.46 100.0 84286 1360.69 100.0
Germany 1273.10 92.6 19845 965.91 70.99
Italy 1104.15 80.3 15354 1002.85 73.70
Spain 1127.14 81.9 9560 993.40 73.01
Ireland 1219.18 88.6 5992 1117.82 82.15
Austria 1375.30 100.0 4580 1132.39 83.22
Belgium 1344.42 97.7 4488 941.14 69.17
Netherlands 1240.23 90.2 8346 1117.82 72.76
Greece 1238.89 90.1 7309 1184.56 87.06
and weeks worked per year1. We construct annual hours worked as the product of
these two variables. To make our data comparable to the OECD aggregate-level
estimates used by Rogerson (2006) and Prescott (2004), we include in our sample
all individuals between 15 and 64 years of age. We make two adjustments to the
LIS data. First, for several European countries the LIS database does not provide
information about the labor market outcomes for 15 and/or 16 year-olds2. In these
instances, we replace the missing values with the appropriate group averages from
the US sample.
Table 3.1 reports the average annual hours worked by individuals who are from
15 to 64 years old in the US and a number of European countries, computed using
the LIS data for year 2000. For comparison, the last two columns of the table also
show the corresponding averages computed using the OECD data.
Unfortunately, for several European countries the average annual hours worked
computed from the LIS data differ substantially from those reported by the OECD.
Further research is needed to understand what causes this discrepancy. One possi-
ble explanation is that the LIS data does not capture the differences between the
countries in the number of holidays and paid vacations3.
1Variables phoursu and pweektl.
2For instance, German data does not have labor market information for both 15 and 16 year-olds,
while for Spain and Ireland, this information is missing only for 15 year-olds
3A vast majority of individuals in all countries in the LIS data report either 0 or 52 weeks
worked per year. At the same time, Jorgensen (2002) documents that individuals in most European
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Table 3.2: Annual Hours Worked, Men and Women, 15-64 yrs. old, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
Annual Hours % of US Annual Hours % of US
US 1596.82 100.0 1164.64 100.0
Germany 1225.33 76.7 716.87 61.6
Italy 1351.31 84.6 658.78 56.6
Spain 1355.47 84.9 633.17 54.4
Ireland 1517.71 95.0 718.02 61.7
Austria 1425.27 89.3 844.41 72.5
Belgium 1192.77 74.7 711.24 61.1
Netherlands 1319.30 82.6 675.91 58.0
Greece 1671.21 104.7 738.49 63.4
Since most of the previous research on the cross-country differences in labor
supply has relied on the OECD data, we use the OECD data to determine the
average country-level annual hours worked, and use the LIS data mainly to compute
the contributions of various demographic groups to the cross-country differences. To
account for the discrepancy between the OECD and LIS data, we uniformly scale all
individual observations in each country in the LIS data so that the aggregate country-
level averages that we obtain from the LIS data are equal to those reported by the
OECD. Such adjustment makes the contributions of various demographic groups to
the cross-country differences in aggregate-level average hours worked more uniform
(in other words, we obtain a conservative estimate of the contribution of women
to the cross-country differences, since this adjustment makes the contribution of
separate demographic groups less pronounced)4.
Table 3.2 shows the average annual hours worked for men and women separately,
computed using the LIS 2000 data (adjusted as explained above). The table shows
that the difference between the hours worked by European women and American
women is larger than the corresponding difference for men, both in percentage and
countries on average enjoy several more weeks of holidays compared to Americans.
4Our current adjustment is appropriate, for example, if the duration of vocations and holidays
for each individual is a certain percent of his/her workdays. If, on the other hand, one assumes
that the duration of vocations is the same for each individual, the differences in the contribution of
various demographic groups would become more emphasized.
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in absolute terms. This difference between genders is more pronounced in Italy,
Spain, Ireland and Greece, and less pronounced in Germany, Belgium and Austria.
Table 3.14 in the appendix shows the average annual hours worked of individuals
in 3 different age groups: 1) “young” (15-20 year-olds), 2) “prime-aged” (21-55 year-
olds) and 3) “old” (56-64 year-olds). There is substantial heterogeneity in hours
worked by the “young” across the countries in our data (part of this could reflect
poorer quality of the data for this age group). The hours worked by the “prime-aged”
and “old” individuals in Europe are uniformly lower compared to the US.
Figure 3.1 plots the age profiles, using more detailed data (5-year age groups),
separately for men and women for the US and European countries. This figure
illustrates that there is a larger difference in hours worked between the US and Europe
for women than for men. It also suggests that while the age profiles for men appear
to have similar shapre in the US and Europe (with hours worked peaking in the
middle age group, 35-44 year-olds), in most European countries (with the exception
of Germany and Austria) the age profiles for women look markedly different, with
hours worked peaking earlier than in the US.
Table 3.3 compares the average annual hours worked by marital status and gen-
der. It shows that in percentage terms married women in Europe display a bigger
difference (work less) relative to their American counterparts than do single women.
For men, the pattern is much less clear.
Given that we find that the difference in hours worked between the US and
Europe is larger for women than for men, it is natural to ask whether this is related
to women reducing their labor supply as a result of having children. Figure 3.13
in the appendix shows that in most of the countries where women worked the least
compared to the US (Italy, Spain and Greece, but not in Ireland), women in fact
tended to have fewer children than in the US.
Table 3.16 shows the hours worked by men and women split into three groups:
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Figure 3.1: Average Hours Worked by Gender and Age Group
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Averages are adjusted so that the total average across all subgroups is equal to the
one reported by the OECD.
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Table 3.3: Annual Hours Worked, by Gender and Marital Status, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
Married Single Married Single
Annual Hours % of US Annual Hours % of US Annual Hours % of US Annual Hours % of US
US 1965.87 100.0 1183.67 100.0 1207.27 100.0 1114.78 100.0
Germany 1398.72 71.2 1022.14 86.4 631.36 52.3 826.44 74.1
Italy 1620.99 82.5 982.29 83.0 651.98 54.0 669.62 60.1
Spain 1675.59 85.2 945.39 79.9 616.55 51.1 656.87 58.9
Ireland 1916.06 97.5 1107.74 93.6 692.64 57.4 747.04 67.0
Austria 1508.93 76.8 1324.17 111.9 807.33 66.9 891.72 80.0
Belgium 1328.43 67.6 971.42 82.1 713.24 59.1 708.17 63.5
Netherlands 1461.07 74.3 1134.34 95.8 553.21 45.8 856.81 76.9
Greece 1896.69 96.5 1276.75 107.9 748.15 62.0 719.60 64.6
1) “child 3”, which includes the individuals who have a child under 3 years of age,
2) “child 6”, which includes the individuals who have a child under 6 years of age,
3) “no child”, which includes individuals with no small children. According to the
table, it is only in Germany and Austria that mothers with small children reduce
their labor supply further compared to the US. In the countries where women worked
the least (Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland), the percentage difference with the US
in hours worked for mothers with small children is smaller than for women without
small children.
These two observations: 1) that fertility in the US is relatively high; 2) women
with small children in Europe do not reduce their labor supply relative to their
American counterparts, suggest that having small children is not a major reason for
the difference in women’s labor supply between the US and Europe.
Group Contribution Decomposition
To analyze the contribution of various demographic groups to the difference between
aggregate labor supply in the US and the European countries in our sample, we
perform the following decomposition. Suppose we divide each country’s sample into
n different groups. Then the difference between the aggregate average annual hours
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worked in the US, Hus, and in country j, Hj, can be written as:
Hus −Hj =
n∑
i=1
ωusi h
us
i −
n∑
i=1
ωjih
j
i
=
n∑
i=1
(husi − h
j
i )ω
us
i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
behavioral effect
+
n∑
i=1
(ωusi − ω
j
i )h
j
i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
(3.1)
where ωji is the share of observations that come from group i in country j’s sample,
while hji is the average annual hours worked by individuals in this group.
We divide the data into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital
status and age (using 3 age groups). We are interested in analyzing the first summand
in the expression above, which we call the behavioral effect, after removing the
sample composition effect (which amounts to looking at a hypothetical case where
the composition of the samples in different countries would be identical). Tables
3.20 and 3.21 in the appendix show the sample compositions in all our countries.
It is worth noting that the total contribution of the compositional effects is quite
small – in most cases, it is smaller than 5% of the total difference in average hours,
except for Belgium (-8.717%), Greece (-7.176%) and Netherlands (-6.174%). Tables
3.17 and 3.18 show the contribution of different demographic groups to the aggregate
difference in hours worked, weighted by the size of the appropriate group in the US
sample,
husi −h
j
i
Hus−Hj
ωusi .
These tables show that women in general contribute more to the differences in
labor supply than men. We find that in all countries, the contribution of women is
larger than 50%. This difference between the contribution of the two genders is espe-
cially large in the four “catholic” countries – Spain, Italy, Ireland and Greece, where
it ranges from 66% in Italy to 101% in Greece. In all countries except Belgium, mar-
ried prime-aged women are the biggest contributing group. In Spain, Italy, Ireland
and Greece single prime-aged women are the second-largest contributing group.
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Intensive vs. Extensive Margin
Table 3.2 shows the contribution of intensive and extensive margins to the overall
cross-country differences in labor supply, using the following decomposition formula:
HUS −H i = HUSempl · Share
US
empl −H
i
empl · Share
i
empl (3.2)
=
(
HUSempl −H
i
empl
)
ShareUSempl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
+
(
ShareUSempl − Share
i
empl
)
H iempl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
From the OECD data, one can compute the total average hours worked in country
i, H i, as the product of the hours worked by employed persons, H iempl, and the share
of the population which is employed, Shareiempl. Table 3.2 reports the contributions
of intensive and extensive margins as a percentage of the total difference in hours
worked between the US and country i, HUS − H i. As can be seen from the table,
both margins appear to be important. The contribution of the extensive margin is
particularly large in Greece, Italy, Spain and Ireland. The intensive margin is more
important in the Netherlands and Germany.
Table 3.4: Contribution of Intensive and Extensive Margins to Cross-Country Dif-
ferences in Labor Supply
Country Intensive Margin, % Extensive Margin, %
Germany 68.21 31.79
Italy -5.16 105.16
Spain 21.34 78.66
Ireland 35.82 64.18
Austria 57.87 42.13
Belgium 51.46 48.54
Netherlands 92.44 7.56
Greece -119.62 219.62
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3.3 Possible Determinants of Labor Supply: Taxes
and Marriage Stability
In this section, we analyze the empirical relationship between hours worked in the
US and Europe, and the following two candidate explanations for cross-country dif-
ferences in labor supply: 1) differences in taxes; 2) differences in marriage stability.
Taxes have been suggested as a major contributor to cross country differences in
labor supply in the literature (see Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006)). Marriage
stability is a new explanation in this context, motivated by our finding in section 3.2
that women are the biggest contributor to the cross-country differences in labor sup-
ply. Our hypothesis is that more stable marriages provide consumption insurance,
thereby reducing the incentives to accumulate labor market experience, in particu-
larly for women (who usually are secondary earners). Conversely, a higher probability
of divorce can increase the value of market experience for the woman who has a higher
probability of ending up as a single earner.
We first compare and discuss some features of the tax systems in the US and
Europe with particular focus on the 9 countries in Table 1: the US, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece. We then study the
correlation between labor supply and various measures of tax levels, tax progres-
sivity, and marriage stability in a larger sample of countries. We find that there is
positive correlation between taxes and aggregate labor supply, and negative correla-
tion between marriage stability and aggregate labor supply, but in both cases, the
correlation is not very strong. In addition, when we regress average annual hours
worked in each country on different measures of taxation and marriage stability sep-
arately, the regression coefficients have the expected sign, but are only marginally
statistically significant (at 10% significance level), and the R2 of the regressions are
very low.
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However, when we combine a measure of tax levels and divorce rates in the
same regression, both regression coefficients become highly statistically significant,
and the adjusted R2 increases considerably (to 49.4%). We conjecture that the
importance of these two mechanisms is different for different groups of countries
within Europe. Finally, we document strong correlation between female employment
rates and divorce rates5. These observations motivate us to more carefully study the
impact of taxes and marriage stability on labor supply in a structural model.
Labor Income Taxes in the US and Europe
There are many issues to consider when comparing labor income taxes across coun-
tries. (i) Firstly, both the levels and progressivity of taxes may be of interest, when
studying the impact of taxation on labor supply. (ii) Secondly, taxes differ with
respect to marital status. In the US, Germany, Spain, and Ireland married couples
are taxed jointly, while in Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece they
are taxed separately. In the whole OECD there are 19 countries practicing separate
taxation of married couples and 11 countries practicing joint taxation. There may
also be slightly different schemes for married households with 1 and 2 earners. (iii)
Finally, taxes vary with the number of children in the household. In this section, we
will focus on the taxes paid by single households without children6.
For each country in Table 3.19, we fit a polynomial tax function, based on tax
data from the OECD7: Among our countries, labor income taxes are the lowest in
Spain and Greece, moderate to low in the US, and highest in Germany and Belgium.
In figure 3.2 we plot fitted labor income tax schedules for single individuals in Spain,
5Unfortunately, we are restricted to using the employment rates when we look at the labor
supply by gender, since the OECD does not provide information for hours worked separately for
men and women.
6Essentially, we abstract in this section from points (ii) and (iii) above. We do it here because
taxes paid by an average single household without children is the measure that is most easily
comparable between the countries. In sections 3.5-3.7, we differentiate between the taxes paid by
single and married households within the structural model of labor supply.
7See Appendix
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Figure 3.2: Country Labor Income Tax Functions (singles)
the US, and Germany.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.19 display the top marginal tax rates and the income
level where they become effective for single households in the US and many Western
European countries. There are not always large differences in the maximum tax rates
but the income level where they become effective also vary greatly. In Germany, for
instance, the top tax rate becomes effective already at 1.5 times average earnings,
while in the US the top marginal rate first becomes effective at 9 times average
earnings. Column 4 of Table 1 displays the labor income tax paid by singles with
average earnings across countries.
A person making labor supply decisions will care about his marginal tax rate in
addition to his tax level. It is possible that tax progressivity, and not only the level
of taxes are important for the cross country pattern in labor supply. A commonly
used measure for tax progressivity is so-called progressivity wedges, see for instance
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Figure 3.3: Country Tax Functions (Singles)
Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009):
PW (y1, y2) = 1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
(3.3)
This measure says something about how fast the tax rate increases as earnings in-
crease from y1 to y2. If there is a flat tax, then the progressivity wedge would be
zero for all levels of y1 and y2. Figure 3.3 plots progressivity wedges for y1 = 0.5AE
for the US, Germany, Spain, Denmark, and Switzerland. Among the 17 countries
in Table 3.19, Denmark has the most progressive taxes and Switzerland the least
progressive. The US is among the countries with the least progressive taxes, while
Germany are among the countries with the most progressive taxes.
Consumption Taxes
Consumption taxes also have an impact on labor supply decisions. The second
column of Table 2 reports these flat taxes in (2001). The consumption tax varies
from 7.6% in Switzerland on the low end to 25% in Denmark and Sweden on the
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high end. Among our 9 countries, the US stands out with low consumption taxes.
Correlation Between Labor Supply and Taxes and Labor Supply and Divorce Rates
In Figure 3.4, we plot the correlation between labor supply and four tax-related
measures. They are: the average labor income tax rate at average earnings, the
average effective tax rate on labor income at average earnings, the top marginal tax
rate, and the tax progressivity wedge at y1 = 0.5AE, y2 = 2AE. The effective tax
rate on labor income, τ , as defined in Prescott (2004) is:
τ = 1−
1− τl
1 + τc
(3.4)
It is the fraction of labor income that is taken in the form of taxes, holding
investment fixed. In other words a measure that combines labor income tax and
consumption tax into a single tax rate.
Figure 3.4: Relationship Between Annual Hours and Tax Measures by Country
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As can be seen from Figure 3.4, there is generally a negative but weak correlation
between different measures of taxes and aggregate hours worked. The strongest cor-
relation, −0.45, is with the effective tax rate at average earnings. There is a negative
relationship between labor supply and all our tax measures, but only the regression
coefficient for the effective tax rate at average earnings is marginally statistically
significant at the 10% level. In addition, the largest adjusted R2 in the regressions
is 15%, so taxes alone do not explain much of the cross- country variation in labor
supply.
In figure 3.5, we plot the correlation between divorce rates and aggregate labor
supply. The data for divorce rates in European countries is constructed using Euro-
stat data, while for the US we use the National Vital Statistics data provided by the
Centers for Decease Control and Prevention, and the US Census data. As can be
seen from Figure 3.5, there is a positive relationship between average annual hours
worked and divorce rates. The regression coefficient is almost statistically significant
at the 5% level, and the adjusted R2 is only 13.7%.
In Table 3.5 we present the results from a regression of labor supply on divorce
rate and each of the different tax measures. In two cases (when using the average
labor income tax and average effective tax rate), the coefficients for both the divorce
rates and the tax measure that we use are statistically significant at any conventional
significance level, and the adjusted R2 improves substantially to 49.4%. Using both
taxes and divorce rates together explains a significant share of the cross- country
variation in labor supply.
Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2008) argue that one of the features of the tax
system that can be particularly important for the labor supply of the married couples
is whether the labor income of the couple is taxed jointly or separately. Table 3.25 in
the appendix reports the regression results when we add a dummy variable equal to
1 for countries in our sample that practice separate taxation. Table 3.25 shows that
72
Figure 3.5: Relationship Between Annual Hours and Divorce Rates by Country
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the coefficient for separate taxation in 3 out of 4 regressions reported in the table
has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant.
Unfortunately, the OECD dataset does not provide data for hours worked sepa-
rately for men and women, but it does provide data on employment rates by gender.
Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between the divorce rates and employment ratios by
country for men and women separately. It shows that for both men and women, this
relationship is positive, but the magnitude of the coefficient is about three times as
large for women as it is for men. In addition, the coefficient is statistically significant
for women and not statistically significant for men.
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 in the appendix show the relationship between our tax
measures and employment ratios for women and men respectively. None of the tax
measures is statistically significant for either of the sexes, and in many cases the
relationship appears to be negative. We conclude that our macro level data suggest
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Table 3.5: Regressing Average Hours Worked on Divorce rate and Tax Measures
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Const 1321.283∗∗∗ 1166.408∗∗∗ 1258.655∗∗∗ 1383.385∗∗∗
(207.819) (137.197) (83.996) (112.1656)
Divorce rate 27.101∗ 19.428 42.036∗∗∗ 36.733∗∗∗
(13.694) (13.418) (11.627) (10.968)
Top marginal tax rate −6.409 – – –
(4.215)
Progressivity wedge – −629.513 – –
(515.734)
Average labor income tax – – −1156.867∗∗∗ –
(316.286)
Average effective tax rate – – – −1088.327∗∗∗
(297.347)
adjusted R2 0.151 0.106 0.494 0.494
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
that while both tax measures and divorce rates appear to be related to annual hours
worked, taxes appear to impact mostly the intensive margin (hours worked for those
who are employed), while divorce rates appear to be related to the extensive margin –
the employment ratios (see figure 3.16), and this relationship appears much stronger
for women.
Finally, Table 3.6 shows the panel regression results, when regressing employment
ratios on divorce rates for men and women separately, using the data from 1990 to
2009 (one obtains a qualitatively similar results when starting at an earlier date)8.
The panel regression results provide further support to our finding that divorce rates
appear to affect mostly the labor supply of women.
In this section, we have documented an empirical relationship between aggregate
labor supply and taxes and aggregate labor supply and divorce rates. This motivates
our study in the next three sections of the impact of taxes, divorce- and marriage
8Since the Eurostat data on the number of divorces that we use to construct the divorce rate
measure spans different time periods for different countries, we have an unbalanced panel. The US
data start in 2000. Also, the data here lacks observations for some European countries, such as
Spain and Greece, altogether. In our previous cross-sectional plots for 2001, we used the Eurostat
Census 2001 data on the number of married people for these countries, but this data is available
only for one year, 2001.
74
Figure 3.6: Relationship Between Divorce Rates and Employment Ratios for Men
and Women by Country
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Table 3.6: Relationship Between Employment Ratios and Divorce Rates, Panel Re-
gression Results
Employment rate Women Men
Constant 51.809∗∗∗ 72.681∗∗∗
(2.795) ( 2.076)
Divorce rates 1.685∗∗∗ 0.323
(0.398) (0.283)
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
probabilities on labor supply in a structural model.
3.4 Gaining Intuition: Labor Supply and Divorce
in a Simple Two-Period Model
In this section, we outline the intuition for the effect of divorce rates on women’s
labor supply using a simplified two-period version of our model9. We describe our
full model in the next section.
Consider a family that consists of a husband (a “man”) and a wife (a “woman”)
9The intuition concerning the effect of taxation is described very well in Rogerson (2007), Guner,
Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2008) etc.
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who live for 2 periods. Suppose that both members of the family have 1 unit of time
at their disposal in each period. For simplicity, assume here that the husband always
works full-time, while the wife has to decide how much time to spend working in
period 1 and in period 2. Assume that the husband’s wage in period 1 is w1,m, while
the wife’s wage in the first period is w1,f . Suppose that their wages in the second
period increase linearly with the amount of time they spend working in period 1,
with parameters km and kf controlling the “returns to experience” for the husband
and the wife. Thus, the husband’s wage in period 2 is w1,m + km (since the husband
always works full-time), while the wife’s wage in period 2 is w1,f + kfh1,f . Assume
that with probability pid, the couple divorces before the second period starts. Suppose
that they cannot save or borrow in period 1.
At the start of period 1, the couple jointly solves:
max
c1,c2,cs2,m,c
s
2,f ,
h1,f ,h2,f ,h
s
2,f
α log(c1/e) + (1− α) log(1− h1,f )
+ (1− pid) (α log(c2/e) + (1− α) log(1− h2,f ))
+ pid
(
α log(cs2,m) + α log(c
s
2,f ) + (1− α) log(1− h
s
2,f )
)
s.t. : c1 = w1,m + w1,fh1,f
c2 = w1,m + km + (w1,f + kfh1,f )h2,f
cs2,m = w1,m + km
cs2,f = (w1,f + kfh1,f )h
s
2,f (3.5)
where h2,f is the woman’s choice of work in period 2 in case she stays married, h
s
2,f
is her choice of work if she gets divorced, and e is the adult equivalence scale.
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The solution is characterized by the following 3 first-order conditions:
1− α
1− h2,f
=
α
c2
(w1,f + kfh1,f ) (3.6)
1− α
1− hs2,f
=
α
cs2,f
(w1,f + kfh1,f ) (3.7)
1− α
1− h1,f
=
α
cs1,f
w1,f + (1− pid)
α
c2
kfh2,f + pid
α
cs2,f
kfh
s
2,f (3.8)
First, let us consider how a change in the probability of divorce, pid, affects the
woman’s choice of labor supply in period 1, h1,f . An increase in pid will affect h1,f
both directly through equation 3.8, and also indirectly through the effect of the
change in h1,f on h2,f and h
s
2,f in equations 3.6 and 3.7, which feeds back into c2
and cs2,f in equation 3.8. For simplicity, let us disregard the indirect effect, and
concentrate on the direct effect in equation 3.8. On the right hand side of that
equation, we have the marginal benefit of an increase in the wife’s work in period
1, which includes both an immediate increase in consumption in period 1, and the
increase in consumption in period 2 because of the accumulation of the woman’s
experience (and increased period 2 wages). An increase in pid effectively decreases the
weight put on the second period’s marginal utility of consumption in case the couple
stays married, and increases the weight on the second period’s marginal utility of
consumption of the divorced woman. Intuitively, because the income of the married
couple also includes the income of the husband (which typically is larger than the
income of the wife), we get c2 > c
s
2,f . From equations 3.6 and 3.7, it also follows that
hs2,f > h2,f , so that
α
cs2,f
hs2,f >
α
c2,f
h2,f , and such re-weighting increases the marginal
benefit from the woman’s work in period 1. This increases the woman’s incentive to
work in period 1.
Given the utility function that we have assumed in this section, one can in fact
show that an increase in divorce probability leads to an increase in the woman’s labor
supply:
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Proposition 3.4.1.
∂h1,f
∂pid
> 0,
∂h2,f
∂pid
> 0,
∂hs2,f
∂pid
= 0 (3.9)
Proof: See Appendix 3.9.3
It is clear from equation 3.8 that for the change in divorce probability to have an
impact on the woman’s labor supply, we need kf > 0 (returns to experience must be
positive). One can expect this impact to be larger, the bigger is the gender wage gap
(wm
wf
). One could also be tempted to conclude from equation 3.8 that the effect of
the change in divorce probability is stronger, the bigger is the returns to experience.
However, even though this is true for fixed c2 and c
s
2,f , and we found it to be true for
a variety of reasonable choices of parameters in this simple two-period model, this
could be at least partially offset by the income effect of the increase in kf , which
could be larger for the single woman.
To see that the increased probability of divorce can also increase labor supply of
single women, imagine that there are 3 periods of active life, all women are single in
period 0, but they are certain to get married in period 1 (and periods 1 and 2 are the
same as the above), and that the the wages the woman receives in period 2 increase
both in experience accumulated in period 0 and 1.
3.5 Quantitative Model
The stationary economy is populated by three types of households: single males,
single females, and married couples. Individuals start their life at age 20. They
live for at least 65 years, and at most 95 years, but enter retirement at age 65.
A model period is 1 year, so there are a total of 45 model periods of active work
life. Single households face an age-dependent probability of becoming married, while
married couples face an age dependent probability of divorce. One is more likely to be
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married to someone with the same level of education. We assume that marriage will
always happen to a partner of the same age, and that married couples die together.
Households decide whether to participate in the labor market, how much to consume,
and how much to save, and they accumulate labor market experience.
Labor Income
The wage, w, of an individual depends on his level of education, j ∈ {hs, c} (where
“hs” stands for high school and “c” stands for college), gender, g ∈ {m, f}, and years
of labor market experience, x:
w(j, g, x) = eγ0jg+γ1jgx+γ2jgx
2+γ3jgx
3
(3.10)
Given this wage function, the beginning wage levels as well as the returns to experi-
ence are allowed to differ by level of education and gender.
Preferences
The momentary utility function of single individuals, US, depends on labor market
participation, n ∈ 0, 1, consumption, c, and on gender:
US(g, c, n) =
c1−σ
1− σ
− Fgn (3.11)
Fg is here a fixed, gender specific, disutility from working. Married couples have a
joint utility function, UM , with shared consumption, measured in adult equivalents:
UM(c, nm, nf ) =
(
c
e
)1−σ
1− σ
− Fmnm − Ffnf (3.12)
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Household’s Problem
Written recursively, a single household’s problem can be formalized as follows:
V S(g, j, k, x, t) = max
c,n,k′
US(g, c, n) + β
(
(1− ω¯(t))V S(g, j, k′, x′, t+ 1)
+ω¯(t)Ejp,k′p,x′p
[
V M(j, jp, k
′ + k′p, x
′, x′p, t+ 1)
])
s.t.: c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + nw(j, g, x)(1− τS(w(j, g, x)n)) + (1− n)T
x′ = x+ n, n ∈ {0, 1}, k′ ≥ 0, c > 0 (3.13)
k here is the level of asset holdings, r is the risk-free interest rate, and β the time
discount factor. τc is a constant consumption tax, while τn is a nonlinear labor
income tax. In the US and some European countries, the tax schedule is dependent on
whether a person is single or married. T is an individual’s income if he chooses not to
participate in the labor market. The sources of such income would be unemployment
benefits, social aid, transfers from relatives and charities and so on. ω¯(t) is a time-
dependent probability of becoming married in the next period. The subscript, p,
stands for partner. In the case that an individual becomes married in the next period,
the expectation of next period’s utility must be taken with respect to the distribution
over potential partners’ education, experience, and asset holdings, Qjgt(jp, x
′
p, k
′
p).
An individual is more likely to find a partner of his own education group, and the
distribution of partners naturally varies by gender and age. The distribution over x′p
and k′p is derived from the individuals’ optimal desicions.
Married couples maximize their joint utility and face a time-dependent probabil-
ity, pi(t), of becoming divorced. When couples divorce, they split their assets evenly.
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Their problem can be written as:
V M(jm, jf , k, xm, xf , t) = max
c,k′,nm,nf
UM(c, nm, nf )
+ β(1− pi(t))V M(jm, jf , k
′, x′m, x
′
f , t+ 1)
+ βpi(t)V S(m, jm, k
′/2, x′m, t+ 1)
+ βpi(t)V S(f, jf , k
′/2, x′f , t+ 1)
s.t: c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + (nmwm + nfwf )(1− τn,M(nmwm + nfwf ))
+(2− (nm + nf ))T
x′m = xm + nm, x
′
f = xf + nf , nf , nm ∈ {0, 1}, k
′ ≥ 0, c > 0 (3.14)
Retired households make no labor supply decisions but receive an amount of social
security, Φ(g), depending on their gender. We assume that retired households do
not marry or get divorced, and that husband and wife die at the same time. Their
problem, if single, is simply:
V S(g, k, t) = max
c>0,k′≥0
US(g, c) + Ω(t)βV S(g, k′, t+ 1)
s.t.: c(1 + τc) = k(1 + r) + Φ(g), (3.15)
where Ω(t) is the probability of survival until the next period. Married retirees solve:
V M(k, t) = max
c>0,k′≥0
UM(c) + Ω(t)βV M(g, k′, t+ 1),
s.t.: c(1 + τc) = k(1 + r) + Φ(m) + Φ(f), (3.16)
3.6 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model parameters. We calibrate our
model to match the appropriate moments from the US data. We use data from
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different sources. We try to use data from 2000 or the year closest to 2000 that we can
obtain. Many parameters can be calibrated to direct empirical counterparts without
solving the model. They are listed in Table3.7. The 7 parameters in Table 2 below
are, however, calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method of moments
approach. We use the data from the European countries in our sample only to obtain
the estimates of tax polynomials and age-specific marriage and divorce probabilities,
which we use in section 3.7 in our counterfactual experiments.
Preferences
The momentary utility function is a standard CRRA utility function in equations
3.11 and , with consumption measured in adult equivalents, c
e
. We use the OECD
adult equivalence scale and set e = 1.7 for married couples, and e = 1.0 for singles.
Consistent with a survey of the empirical literature in Browning et. al. (1999), we
set the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, equal to 2. The discount factor, β,
and fixed costs of working, Fm and Ff , are among the estimated parameters. The
corresponding data moments are the mean asset holdings of households with head
aged 20 − 64, taken from the PSID (99-05), and the male- and female employment
rates, taken from OECD 2000.
Risk Free Interest Rate
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, we take the risk free rate as fixed
and calibrate it using the data. We set the risk free rate equal to the average of
3-month t-bill rates minus inflation over the period from 1947-2008 based on data
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis10.
Wages
We calibrate the experience profile of wages exogenously, using the PSID from 1968-
1997. After 1997 it is not possible to get years of actual labor market experience
10Series TB3MS and GDPDEF.
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from the PSID. We regress earnings on a 3rd order polynomial in years of labor
market experience and control for the year of birth. We estimate different returns to
experience for each gender/education group. To get levels of earnings that are in line
with the asset holdings, we include a parameter controlling the average earnings of
each gender/education group in the structural estimation. The corresponding data
moments are the average wage of each group in the PSID 99-05.
Taxes
The labor income tax schedule is a polynomial function of an individual’s earnings
relative to the average earnings, AE, equation 3.20 in the appendix. As described in
more detail in the appendix, we fit this polynomial to labor income tax data from
the OECD tax database (2001). This data is constructed by the OECD based on tax
laws from different countries. It is well suited for cross country comparisons, see also
see Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009). For those countries who practice joint
taxation of married couples, we fit a different tax schedule for married and single
individuals. Coming up with an accurate estimate of consumption taxes in the US
is complicated by the fact that there are local county-level taxes in addition to state
taxes. Vertex Inc. (a consulting company) estimated that the average consumption
tax in the US was 8.4% in 2002. We use that number. For simplicity, we abstract
from capital taxes. we do this because different types of capital is taxed differently,
and this also differs across countries. Households do for instance have about half
of their wealth in their homes which may or may not be taxed. In the US, interest
income is taxed as labor income, while dividends and capital gains are subject to
capital gains tax. The return on capital is, however, set very conservatively in our
calibration. It is set equal to the returns on risk free bonds, which was 1.1% over
the past 60 years.
Death Probabilities and Social Security
The probability that a retiree will survive to the next period, we obtain from the
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Table 3.7: Parameters Calibrated Outside of the Model
Parameter Value Description Target
r 0.011 Risk free interest rate (annual) 3-mnth T-bill minus
inflation (1947-2008)
σ 2 u(c, n) = (c/e)
(1−σ)
(1−σ)
Browning et. al. (1999)
e 1.0 or 1.7 OECD equivalence scale.
γ1hsm, γ2hsm, γ3hsm 0.066, -20(-4), 17(-6) whsm = e
(γ0hsm+γ1hsmx+γ2hsmx
2+γ3hsmx
3) PSID (1968-1997)
γ1cm, γ2cm, γ3cm 0.109, -32(-4), 26(-6) wcm = e
(γ0cm+γ1cmx+γ2cmx2+γ3cmx3)
γ1hsf , γ2hsf , γ3hsf 0.069, -16(-4), 12(-6) whsf = e
(γ0hsf+γ1hsfx+γ2hsfx
2+γ3hsfx
3)
γ1cf , γ2cf , γ3cf 0.064, -12(-4), 6(-6) wcf = e
(γ0cf+γ1cfx+γ2cfx
2+γ3cfx
3)
τs0, τs1 1.727, -6.450 τ(y) = τs0 + τs1(y/AE)
0.2 OECD tax data (01)
τs2, τs3 8.995, -5.000 +τs2(y/AE)
0.4 + τs3(y/AE)
0.6
τs4 0.988 +τs4(y/AE)
0.8
τm0, τm1 2.162, -7.302 τ(y) = τm0 + τm1(y/AE)
0.2 OECD tax data (01)
τm2, τm3 9.222, -4.736 +τm2(y/AE)
0.4 + τm3(y/AE)
0.6
τm4 0.872 +τm4(y/AE)
0.8
τc 0.084 Consumption tax Vertex Inc. (2002)
T $8440 income if not working CEX 2000-2001
Φ(m),Φ(f) $12600, $9680 Social security S.S. Admin. (2000)
ω¯(t) Varies Prob. of marriage CPS (1999-2001)
pi(t) Varies Prob of divorce CPS (1999-2001)
Γ(t) Varies Death probabilities NCHS (1991-2001)
Fraction w. some college. 0.533 CPS (1999-2001)
Prob. intra ed. marriage 0.737 CPS (1999-2001)
k0 8260 Savings at age 20 NLSY97
M0 0.126 Share of married 20 year-olds CPS (1999-2001)
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Table 3.8: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Description Data Moment Value
γ0hsm whsm = e
(γ0hsm+γ1hsmx+γ2hsmx
2+γ3hsmx
3) Mean male hs-wages -1.438
γ0cm wcm = e
(γ0cm+γ1cmx+γ2cmx2+γ3cmx3) Mean male c-wages -1.464
γ0hsf whsf = e
(γ0hsf+γ1hsfx+γ2hsfx
2+γ3hsfx
3) Mean female hs-wages -2.081
γ0cf wcf = e
(γ0cf+γ1cfx+γ2cfx
2+γ3cfx
3) Mean female c-wages -1.692
β Discount factor Mean assets 1.001
Fm Fixed cost of working Male employment rate 2.092
Ff Fixed cost of working Female employment rate 2.265
National Center for Health Statistics (1991-2001). We assume that all retirees receive
the same constant Social Security benefit, only dependent on gender. We obtain the
average benefit for males and females from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the
Social Security Bulletin (2000).
Marriage and Divorce Probabilities
To compute the age-specific probabilities for marriage and divorce for the US, we
use the data from the CPS March supplement from 1999-2001. For most European
countries, we use the data from Eurostat on-line database11. For some European
countries, we supplement it with the data from the IPUMS International.
We assume the stationary environment, where the probabilities of getting married
and divorced don’t change over time (we allow them to depend on the age of the
person, but not on his/her cohort)12. We also assume that the probability of getting
married is the same for those who get married for the first time, and those who
were previously divorced. This allows us to compute the probabilities using the
following approach. Let Mt and Dt be the share of the married and divorced persons
respectively at age t13. Then the probability of getting married at age t, pimt , and the
11Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
12Figure 3.17 in appendix shows the number of divorces per 1000 marriages for 3 countries – US,
Italy and Netherlands over a span of 10 (in case of US) to 20 (in case of Netherlands and Italy) years.
It shows that even though the number of divorces have been increasing in Italy and decreasing in
the US, these changes over time were rather slow and small compared to the differences in levels.
13Figure 3.18 in appendix shows the share of married women in the countries in our sample.
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probability of getting divorced at age t, pidt , is pinned down by:
Mt+1 = (1−Mt)pi
m
t +Mt(1− pi
d
t ) (3.17)
Dt+1 = Dt(1− pi
m
t ) +Mtpi
d
t (3.18)
We smooth the resulting age-profiles for pimt and pi
d
t by fitting a polynomial. Figure 3.7
shows the resulting probability profiles for the US, Germany and Italy14.
Figure 3.7: Age-Dependent Probabilities of Marriage and Divorce
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Figure 3.7 shows that the probability of getting divorced is noticeably higher in
the US than Italy, and somewhat higher than in Germany. At the same time, the
probability of getting married reaches its peak in the US somewhat earlier compared
to the two European countries15.
Fixed Cost of Working and Income if Not Working
The data moments for the fixed cost of working for men and women are the male
and female employment rates in 2000, taken from the OECD. As an approximation
for income when not working, we take the value of non-housing consumption of
14Countries like Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal have marriage and divorce probabilities
similar to Italy, and countries like Netherlands and Belgium are similar in this respect to Germany.
15The computed probabilities use the data for women. We get a qualitatively similar picture
when using the data for both men and women (with the exception that men in all countries tend
to get married somewhat later than women).
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Table 3.9: Calibration Fit
Moment Data Model
Mean wage of high school educated males 0.396 0.396
Mean wage of college educated males 0.594 0.594
Mean wage of high school educated females 0.255 0.255
Mean wage of college educated females 0.372 0.372
Mean assets 1.200 1.198
Male employment rate 0.841 0.841
Female employment rate 0.699 0.700
households with income less than $5000 per year from the 2000-2001 Consumer
Expenditure Survey. The sources of such income would be unemployment benefits,
social aid, gifts from relatives and charities etc.
Estimation Method
7 model parameters are calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method
of moments approach. We minimize the squared percentage deviation of simulated
model statistics from the 7 data moments in Table 3. Let Θ = {γ0hsm, γ0cm, γ0hsf , γ0cf ,
β, Fm, Ff} and let V (Θ) = (V1(Θ), . . . , V7(Θ))
′ denote the vector where Vi(Θ) =
(m¯−mˆ(Θ))/m is the percentage difference between empirical moments and simulated
moments. Then:
Vˆ = min
Θ
V (Θ)′V (Θ) (3.19)
Table3.8 summarizes the estimated parameter values. As can be seen from Table
3.9, we get close to match all the moments exactly.
3.7 Counterfactual Experiments
In Section 3.3, we have documented a correlation between labor supply and tax levels
and labor supply and divorce rates across countries and across time. This motivates
the study, in this section, of the quantitative impact of cross country differences
in tax schemes and divorce rates on labor supply. When we perform the policy
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experiments, we keep taxes, old age social security, and income when not working
as functions of average earnings in the economy. In this way if the society becomes
richer or poorer because of a counterfactual experiment, taxes and social security
payments will adjust accordingly. Since there is no public good in the model, we
do not keep a balanced government budget and excess tax revenues are assumed to
finance bureaucracy.
The Effect of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Labor Supply
In this subsection, we use our model that we described in Section 3.5, and calibrated
to match the US economy in Section 3.6, to study the impact of marriage and divorce
probabilities on labor supply. We do this by imposing the marriage and divorce
probabilities that we computed for each of the European countries in our sample on
the model. Figure 3.8 shows how it affects hours worked16. We obtain a positive
correlation between the model’s predictions and the data (equal to 0.467). As we
expect, higher marriage stability reduces labor supply both in the model and in the
data.
Ideally, if the model matched the data perfectly, all observations would be lo-
cated somewhere on the diagonal line. The distance from the diagonal shows the
discrepancy between the data and the model prediction.
Table 3.10 and figures 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate the impact on the employment rates
for men and women. Unfortunately, we cannot perform the comparison by gender in
terms of the hours worked because of the lack of the data. However, as we show in
Section 3.3, marriage stability appears to affect mostly the extensive margin.
Figure 3.9 shows a rather high correlation (equal to 0.825) between our model’s
predictions and data for the individuals of both genders – higher marriage stability
appears to reduce labor supply both in the model and in the data. Figure 3.10 shows
16Since we do not have the intensive margin in our model, we compute the predicted annual
hours worked for all European countries in our sample as a product of employment rates predicted
by our model and hours worked by employment persons in the data in the US.
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Figure 3.8: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Hours Worked,
Both Genders
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Table 3.10: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment Rates
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates Female Employment Rates Male Employment Rates
Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model
US 0.770 0.770 0.699 0.699 0.841 0.841
Greece 0.610 0.704 0.450 0.608 0.781 0.800
Italy 0.574 0.706 0.421 0.616 0.728 0.795
Spain 0.610 0.727 0.445 0.646 0.774 0.809
Belgium 0.662 0.733 0.564 0.649 0.759 0.817
Switzerland 0.809 0.745 0.715 0.669 0.903 0.821
Germany 0.687 0.739 0.610 0.659 0.762 0.819
Netherlands 0.737 0.749 0.637 0.668 0.835 0.829
UK 0.737 0.755 0.665 0.685 0.810 0.825
Norway 0.805 0.771 0.763 0.702 0.847 0.840
Denmark 0.779 0.774 0.733 0.703 0.823 0.844
Finland 0.718 0.781 0.684 0.720 0.751 0.841
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that the correlation between the model predictions and the data is even higher for
women (equal to 0.889). Figure 3.19 in appendix shows that the correlation between
the model’s predictions and the data is substantially worse for men (equal to 0.474).
This is not surprising, as we expect the marriage stability mechanism to be able to
better account for the behavior of women.
Figure 3.9: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment Rates,
Both Genders
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We conclude that the marriage stability mechanism works in the right direction in
our model by reducing the labor supply in the countries with more stable marriages.
As one would expect, this mechanism appears to be able to account better for the
labor supply of women.
The Impact of Differences in Taxation on Labor Supply
Figure 3.20 compares the predictions of our model to the data when we assume that
the divorce and marriage probabilities in all countries are the same as in the US,
but replace the tax system in the model by the one computed for each country using
the OECD data (as described in section 3.6), and furthermore assume that all the
difference in tax revenues that result from the change of the tax system go to waistful
90
Figure 3.10: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment
Rates, Women
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government spending. The figure shows that there is little impact on hours worked in
our model in this case. We in fact obtain a negative correlation between our model’s
predictions and the data. Table 3.24 shows that one feature of the tax system that
appears to be particularly important in our model is whether the married couples
are taxed jointly or separately. In table 3.24, we see that our model predicts that
labor supply is noticeably higher in the countries that practice separate taxation.
Table 3.23 shows that this is primarily driven in the model by higher employment
ratios of women.
Figure 3.21 shows that the predictions of our model improve when we assume
that the additional tax revenues are redistributed to all the agents in the economy as
a lump sum. This illustrates that the use of the tax revenues is crucial in our model
for taxes to have a negative effect on labor supply.
The Combined Impact of Divorces and Taxation on Labor Supply
Figure 3.11 shows the impact of both the divorce and tax mechanisms combined in
our model. When we include both mechanisms in the model, the correlation between
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the model’s predictions and the data increase to 0.637, and we are able to explain
41% of the variation in hours worked in the data (as shown by the R2).
On average, the experiment with changing only the divorce rates can account for
22% of the difference between the US and European countries in our sample, the
experiment with changing only the tax system (and assuming redistribution of the
additional tax revenues) can account for 19% of the difference, and in the experiment
with both mechanisms included we account for 28% of the difference.
As can be seen from table 3.11, for Italy, Spain and Greece marriage stability ap-
pears to be a more important mechanism, while taxes is a relatively good predictor
of labor supply in Germany, Belgium and Scandinavia. One interesting observation
is that by a more careful modeling of the tax systems and introduction of the divorce
mechanism we are able to resolve what Rogerson (2007) calls a puzzle, the fact that
Scandinavian countries have among the highest taxes but still greater labor supply
than a country like Germany. An important feature of the tax system in all Scan-
dinavian countries (except Norway) is separate taxation of married couples. As was
pointed out by Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2008), this can help explain higher
labor supply in these countries. For Denmark and Finland, the average tax level
mechanism cannot account for the higher labor supply in these countries compared
with Germany, as average tax level is higher in Denmark and about the same in Fin-
land. However, both of these countries have separate taxation of married couples.
We conclude that our counterfactual experiments suggest that both the divorce
and the tax mechanisms are important for accounting for the differences in labor
supply between the US and Europe. The significance of these two mechanisms appear
to vary for different European countries. When combined, they on average allow us
to account for 28% of the difference.
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Figure 3.11: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Hours Worked,
Both Genders
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Table 3.11: Labor Supply, Taxation and Marriage and Divorce Rates
Country Divorces Taxation Divorces and Taxation Data
US 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Greece 91.536 104.381 95.566 87.056
Italy 91.718 99.362 91.978 73.701
Spain 94.539 100.871 93.954 73.007
Belgium 95.319 91.562 88.234 69.167
Switzerland 96.840 99.869 93.655 97.234
Germany 96.060 88.782 86.648 70.987
Netherlands 97.334 97.685 95.696 72.762
UK 98.088 99.765 98.634 90.783
Norway 100.208 92.056 92.069 83.313
Denmark 100.585 89.287 90.821 88.802
Finland 101.482 97.282 98.647 86.886
The table shows hours worked (model predictions and data) as a percent of hours
worked in the US.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we show that prime aged women is the largest contributor to dif-
ferences in aggregate labor supply between the US and Europe. We document a
negative cross-country correlation between tax levels and labor supply and a posi-
tive correlation between divorce rates and labor supply across time and place. The
latter correlation is, however, driven by a strong correlation between female labor
supply and divorce rates.
To quantify the impact of differences in tax schemes and divorce/marriage rates
on labor supply, we develop a life-cycle, overlapping-generations model with hetero-
geneous agents, marriage, and divorce. We calibrate our model to US data and study
how labor supply in the US change as we introduce European tax systems, and as we
replace the US divorce and marriage rates with their European equivalents. Chang-
ing the US probabilities of marriage and divorce to their European counterparts on
average accounts for 22% of the difference in hours worked between the US and the
11 European countries. When we also introduce European taxes and redistribute the
increase in taxes evenly to all households, we can account for 28% of the difference
in hours worked between the US and Europe.
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Fitting Tax Functions Based on Data from the OECD
For every country in Figure 3, we fit the below polynomial where an individuals
average tax rate is a function of his earnings relative to the average earnings in the
economy:
τ(y) = τ0 + τ1
( y
AE
)0.2
+ τ2
( y
AE
)0.4
+ τ3
( y
AE
)0.6
+ τ4
( y
AE
)0.8
(3.20)
We use this functional form because it generally gives us a very good fit, R2, and
because we get functions that are strictly increasing and well behaved on a relatively
wide range of labor income. We use labor income tax data from the OECD Tax-
Benefit Calculator17 and the OECD Tax Database18. This data is constructed by the
OECD based on tax laws from different countries. The OECD Tax-Benefit Calculator
gives the gross- and net-, after taxes and benefits, labor income, by family type in
2001. For single individuals we can get tese data for every percentile of average
labor income for a range between 50% and 200% of average labor income. For
married couples, one spouse’s earnings have to be fixed at either 0%, 67%, 100% or
167% of average labor income, while the other spouse’s earnings can take any whole
percent value between 50% and 200% of average labor income. For countries that
practice joint taxation of married couples, we fit different polynomials for married
and single. We use the data for single and married individuals without children. For
married individuals, we let the couples be as symmetric as possible. In the US this is
inconsequential, since the tax system is completely symmetric, i.e. it does not matter
who makes the income. The OECD Tax Database provides the top marginal tax rate
in each country and the starting point for this tax rate for single individuals. To get
17Available at: www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39717906_1_1_1_1,00.html.
18Available at: www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html.
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the tax at earnings above 200% of average labor income, we use this information.
For many countries the top marginal tax rate kicks in before 200% of average labor
income but in the US, for instance, the top marginal tax rate starts at about 9 times
average earnings. We then assume that the marginal tax rate increases linearly
between 2 times average earnings and the point where the top marginal tax rate
becomes effective. For countries that practice joint taxation of married couples, we
assume that the top marginal tax rate for married starts at twice the level for singles.
Table 3.12: Country Tax Functions for Married Couples
Country τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 R
2
France -0.4677592 2.062677 -2.743411 1.820481 -0.4305004 0.9989
Germany -0.5409343 -0.9886915 4.474231 -3.421762 0.7909097 0.9962
Ireland 1.612143 -6.871639 9.391285 -4.898055 0.8901651 0.9940
Norway -5.335858 14.96881 -15.43612 7.362051 -1.335945 0.9981
Portugal 3.907341 -12.23614 13.88106 -6.514196 1.101643 0.9995
Spain -2.811092 8.034616 -8.401096 4.023208 -0.7058137 0.9959
Switzerland -16.09581 48.2164 -53.35435 26.20165 -4.78368 0.9950
USA 2.16239 -7.301506 9.221961 -4.736035 0.8718943 0.9949
Table 3.13: Country Tax Functions for Singles
Country τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 R
2
Austria -5.626168 16.19854 -16.39948 7.397988 -1.250442 0.9937
Belgium -4.587984 13.62661 -14.19084 6.823648 -1.24974 0.9959
Denmark 0.1422833 -2.357568 5.737164 -3.968169 0.8855884 0.9940
Finland -1.387284 2.706099 -0.9767094 -0.0860593 0.0717587 0.9987
France 0.7157418 -2.514716 3.64648 -1.88936 0.3320441 0.9980
Germany -6.582745 19.08046 -19.22463 8.580912 -1.430125 0.9964
Greece -5.55185 14.76655 -14.7313 6.887032 -1.237959 0.9909
Ireland -1.75284 2.625375 0.1463597 -1.13193 0.3456357 0.9983
Italy -1.555522 2.965259 -0.9916236 -0.3076185 0.1599916 0.9992
Netherlands 1.126893 -4.322011 6.331867 -3.487033 0 .6651015 0.9899
Norway 2.335783 -8.6315 11.83152 -6.471281 1.25354 0.9988
Portugal 2.604929 -9.655736 12.78917 -6.821912 1.293703 0.9994
Spain -2.640157 7.853874 -8.641411 4.527437 -0.9025463 0.9979
Sweden 5.645098 -18.75109 23.36599 -12.24517 2.322895 0.9968
Switzerland -1.4185 5.181097 -6.488006 3.771889 -0.8035895 0.9985
UK -0.3775787 0.2900424 1.07663 -0.9579886 0.2236049 0.9953
USA 1.727408 -6.44973 8.994808 -4.999817 0.9875019 0.9969
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Figure 3.12: Country Tax Functions (Married)
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3.9.2 Computational Details
Computation of Optimal Policies
We put boundaries on the capital space and pick a 16 point grid inK = [kmin, kmax].
Capital is the only continuous state variable. Let J = {hs, c} be the state space for
whether an individual is high school or college educated, X = {0, , 44} be the state
space for the number of years of labor market experience, and T = {20, , 95} be the
state space for age. The state space for working age married individuals is then:
T × J × J ×X ×X ×K, for working age single individuals it is: T × J ×X ×K,
and for retired individuals, both married and single it is: T ×K. We compute the
household’s optimal policies for each state by iterating backwards. We start from age
95, the last period of life. In that period, the next period’s value function is 0, and
the optimal policy is to consume as much as possible. Knowing the value function at
age 95, we can compute optimal policies and value functions for age 94, and so on.
The labor supply decisions are discrete, and so we compare the different options. For
each choice of labor, we must solve for the optimal level of next period’s capital. We
find the optimal choice of capital by “golden search”. To interpolate next period’s
value function outside of the grid, we use cubic splines.
Simulation
We simulate an over lapping generations economy with 100 000 men and 100 000
women in each identical generation. Knowing today’s state, the policy functions,
and next period’s marital status, we can find the next period’s state. To determine
next period’s marital status, we draw a random number, ν ∈ (0, 1), for every single
individual and every married couple in each time period. We use the age dependent
probabilities for divorce and marriage to determine whether a single individual is
going to marry or a couple is going to split. We only let the random number drawn
by the single men determine if they are going to get married. Then to find them a
partner, we sort single men- and women by their random number and find a partner
98
for each man that is going to change status. We also make sure that the right number
of men marries someone with the same level of education.
Partial Equilibrium
When we calibrate the model we must have equilibrium in the marriage market, in
the sense that single individuals must have rational expectations about their poten-
tial partners in the next period. This expectation must be taken with respect to
education, experience, and asset holdings, Qjgt(jp, x
′
p, k
′
p). Given his own education,
an individual knows the likelihood of marrying someone whit high school and college
education in the next period. We keep track of the distribution of single individuals
in each education group with respect to capital and experience at every age. We
start out with an educated guess and then solve the model iteratively until we reach
a fixed point.
When we perform the policy experiments we must also solve for a fixed point in
terms of the average earnings in the economy because the tax functions, the social
security payments, and the value of not working are kept as functions of average
earnings. Finally when redistributing the increase in tax revenues, we must solve for
a fixed point in terms of the lump sum redistribution.
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3.9.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Given the choice of the utility function, one can solve for h2,f and h
s
2,f in terms of
h1,f from equations 3.6 and 3.7, and after plugging these solutions into 3.8, obtain
that the dependence of h1,f on pid is implicitly defined by:
G(h1,f , pid)
=
αw1,f
w1,m + w1,fh1,f
−
1− α
1− h1,f
+ pid
(
αkf
w1,f + kfh1,f
)
+(1− pid)
(
kf
w1,f + kfh1,f + w1,m + km
(
α+ (α− 1)
(
w1,m + km
w1,f + kfh1,f
)))
= 0 (3.21)
Using the implicit function theorem, one can show that:
sign
(
∂h1,f
∂pid
)
= sign
(
∂G
∂pid
)
(3.22)
= sign
(
α
w1,f + kfh1,f
−
1
w1,f + kfh1,f + w1,m + km
(
α+ (α− 1)
(
w1,m + km
w1,f + kfh1,f
)))
Since
w1,f+kfh1,f+w1,m+km
w1,f+kfh1,f
> 1 > 1 + α−1
α
(
w1,m+km
w1,f+kfh1,f
)
, we get
∂h1,f
∂pid
> 0.
An increase in woman’s labor supply in period 1 leads to accumulation of expe-
rience, and thus higher wages in period 2. On one hand, this gives both the married
and the single woman an incentive to increase labor supply in period 2 through
the substitution effect. However, there is also potentially an offsetting income ef-
fect. Intuitively, the income effect will be stronger for the divorced woman who does
not have access to her spouse’s income (and thus, its is more likely that the married
woman will increase her labor supply in period 2). Given the utility function we have
assumed in this section, we get hs2,f = α and h2,f =
α(w1,f+kfh1,f+w1,m+km)−(w1,m+km)
w1,f+kfh1,f
,
so that
∂hs2,f
∂pid
= 0 and
∂h2,f
∂pid
=
∂h2,f
∂h1,f
∂h1,f
∂pid
=
kf (w1,m+km)(1−α)
(w1,f+kfh1,f )2
∂h1,f
∂pid
> 0

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3.9.4 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.13: Share of Persons With Children Younger Than 3 Years Old, by Age
Group
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Figure 3.14: Relationship Between Tax Measures and Employment Ratios for Women
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Figure 3.15: Relationship Between Tax Measures and Employment Ratios for Men
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Figure 3.16: Relationship Between Divorce Rates and Employment Ratios for Both
Genders
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Figure 3.17: Trends in the Number of Divorces Over Time
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Table 3.14: Annual Hours Worked, by Age Group, LIS 2000
Country 15-20 yr % of US 21-55 yr % of US 56-64 yr % of US
US 363.70 100.0 1600.89 100.0 1077.54 100.0
Germany 310.46 85.4 1154.65 72.1 582.38 54.0
Italy 102.50 28.2 1232.94 77.0 505.38 46.9
Spain 167.36 46.0 1177.30 73.5 644.34 59.8
Ireland 336.59 92.5 1309.16 81.8 782.43 72.6
Austria 571.16 157.0 1325.48 82.8 507.15 47.1
Belgium 90.54 24.9 1132.67 70.8 320.16 29.7
Netherlands 352.51 96.9 1152.01 72.0 446.21 41.4
Greece 173.91 47.8 1422.52 88.9 698.62 64.8
Figure 3.18: Share of Married and Divorced Women at Different Ages
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Table 3.15: Annual Hours Worked, by Age Group and Sex, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
15-20 yr % of US 21-55 yr % of US 56-64 yr % of US 15-20 yr % of US 21-55 yr % of US 56-64 yr % of US
US 380.80 100.0 1865.56 100.0 1309.24 100.0 345.88 100.0 1349.64 100.0 874.74 100.0
Germany 333.71 87.6 1464.09 78.5 779.80 59.6 287.22 83.0 857.98 63.6 395.93 45.3
Italy 130.80 34.3 1645.44 88.2 782.11 59.7 72.63 21.0 827.07 61.3 239.35 27.4
Spain 243.36 63.9 1587.55 85.1 992.96 75.8 85.96 24.9 768.40 56.9 321.42 36.7
Ireland 432.49 113.6 1761.80 94.4 1274.16 97.3 230.79 66.7 865.56 64.1 283.31 32.4
Austria 696.83 183.0 1649.07 88.4 725.37 55.4 452.59 130.9 1004.45 74.4 296.82 33.9
Belgium 155.56 40.9 1426.76 76.5 498.50 38.1 19.62 5.7 868.73 64.4 156.29 17.9
Netherlands 337.53 88.6 1530.10 82.0 679.06 51.9 366.06 105.8 788.86 58.4 225.45 25.8
Greece 261.82 68.8 1948.03 104.4 1169.27 89.3 101.26 29.3 931.88 69.0 277.77 31.8
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Table 3.16: Annual Hours Worked, With and Without Children, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
child 3 % of US child 6 % of US no children % of US child 3 % of US child 6 % of US no children % of US
US 2096.01 100.0 2093.84 100.0 1502.11 100.0 946.43 100.0 1021.13 100.0 1197.06 100.0
Germany 1604.33 76.5 1585.37 75.7 1170.99 78.0 196.58 20.8 304.35 29.8 786.22 65.7
Italy 2027.87 96.7 1976.34 94.4 1257.59 83.7 757.66 80.1 744.57 72.9 645.82 54.0
Spain 1883.10 89.8 1871.86 89.4 1273.15 84.8 676.93 71.5 642.64 62.9 631.69 52.8
Ireland 2045.85 97.6 2063.94 98.6 1390.88 92.6 680.39 71.9 639.05 62.6 740.95 61.9
Austria 1725.81 82.3 1751.53 83.7 1370.35 91.2 434.21 45.9 543.47 53.2 895.71 74.8
Belgium 1525.43 72.8 1540.27 73.6 1118.88 74.5 852.11 90.0 856.72 83.9 678.38 56.7
Netherlands 1668.32 79.6 1681.76 80.3 1232.26 82.0 583.29 61.6 568.38 55.7 702.31 58.7
Greece 2195.55 104.7 2218.34 105.9 1582.30 105.3 899.60 95.1 883.38 86.5 716.79 59.9
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Table 3.17: Contribution of Different Demographic Groups to the Difference in Av-
erage Hours Worked Between the US and Europe
Germany
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.391 0.507 0.171 0.743
21-55: 25.379 10.538 33.299 14.594
56-64: 6.053 1.074 4.465 2.787
Total: 43.941 56.058
Austria
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.422 -9.176 -0.720 -2.356
21-55: 27.700 3.199 34.182 20.023
56-64: 12.037 0.308 8.663 5.719
Total: 34.488 65.511
Belgium
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: -0.103 3.025 0.362 4.172
21-55: 26.239 8.854 22.143 16.891
56-64: 7.473 1.789 5.763 3.393
Total: 47.276 52.723
Netherlands
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.380 0.434 0.030 -0.379
21-55: 23.357 6.533 36.989 14.941
56-64: 6.649 1.690 6.215 3.160
Total: 39.043 60.956
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Table 3.18: Contribution of Different Demographic Groups to the Difference in Av-
erage Hours Worked Between the US and Europe, continued
Greece
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.760 3.320 0.698 7.129
21-55: -6.865 -3.162 45.841 29.511
56-64: 4.366 0.271 10.115 8.016
Total: -1.309 101.309
Ireland
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.590 -1.744 0.648 2.452
21-55: 4.882 7.890 44.842 26.557
56-64: -0.173 0.511 8.148 5.397
Total: 11.956 88.043
Spain
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: -0.036 2.149 0.346 3.894
21-55: 12.859 12.912 33.838 21.756
56-64: 3.853 0.699 5.518 2.211
Total: 32.436 67.563
Italy
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.407 4.092 0.395 4.285
21-55: 11.360 10.105 32.058 19.440
56-64: 6.371 1.376 5.980 4.132
Total: 33.710 66.289
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Table 3.19: Tax-Related Measures by Country (2001)
Country Max
marginal
rate
Earnings level where the max
marginal rate becomes effec-
tive
Consumption
tax
Average labor income tax
rate paid by the average
worker
Austria 42.7% 2.2*AE 20.0 32.0%
Belgium 67.5% 1.2*AE 21.0 42.2%
Denmark 62.9% 1.0*AE 25.0 43.9%
Finland 59.1% 2.1*AE 22.0 32.8%
France 49.5% 1.8*AE 19.6 29.0%
Germany 51.2% 1.5*AE 16.0 42.4%
Greece 51.6% 3.8*AE 18.0 16.5%
Ireland 48.0% 1.1*AE 21.0 23.3%
Italy 45.9% 3.7*AE 20.0 27.0%
Netherlands 52.0% 1.4*AE 19.0 31.5%
Norway 55.3% 2.4*AE 24.0 31.8%
Portugal 46.6% 4.9*AE 17.0 21.3%
Spain 48.0% 4.2*AE 16.0 19.7%
Sweden 55.5% 1.5*AE 25.0 33.8%
Switzerland 49.5% 3.9*AE 7.6 23.8%
UK 40.0% 1.3*AE 17.5 25.5%
USA 47.4% 9.0*AE 8.4 26.0%
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Table 3.20: Sample Compositions
United States
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.001 0.067 0.003 0.063
21-55: 0.215 0.151 0.234 0.151
56-64: 0.041 0.012 0.039 0.022
Germany
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049
21-55: 0.195 0.156 0.219 0.146
56-64: 0.070 0.020 0.067 0.029
Total contribution of compositional effects = 2.798%
Spain
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.057 0.001 0.053
21-55: 0.224 0.153 0.239 0.139
56-64: 0.056 0.008 0.055 0.015
Total contribution of compositional effects = -4.692%
Italy
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.052 0.001 0.049
21-55: 0.219 0.149 0.248 0.125
56-64: 0.068 0.009 0.061 0.019
Total contribution of compositional effects = -2.597%
Austria
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.045
21-55: 0.208 0.169 0.231 0.149
56-64: 0.063 0.012 0.050 0.028
Total contribution of compositional effects = -1.030%
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Table 3.21: Sample Compositions, continued
Belgium
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.036
21-55: 0.242 0.129 0.264 0.150
56-64: 0.054 0.014 0.053 0.020
Total contribution of compositional effects = -8.717%
Greece
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.040 0.001 0.048
21-55: 0.227 0.129 0.269 0.112
56-64: 0.078 0.005 0.075 0.017
Total contribution of compositional effects = -7.176%
Ireland
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.064
21-55: 0.211 0.160 0.223 0.156
56-64: 0.042 0.015 0.043 0.014
Total contribution of compositional effects = -2.310%
Netherlands
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.041
21-55: 0.223 0.160 0.251 0.147
56-64: 0.053 0.014 0.052 0.019
Total contribution of compositional effects = -6.174%
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Figure 3.19: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment
Rates, Men
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Table 3.22: The Impact of Taxation (Without Redistributiion) on Hours Worked
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates
Actual Model
Countries with joint taxation of married couples:
US 100.000 100.000
Germany 70.987 98.400
Norway 83.313 101.351
Spain 73.007 101.625
Switzerland 97.234 100.012
Countries with separate taxation of married couples:
Greece 87.056 107.839
Italy 73.701 109.412
Belgium 69.167 110.231
Netherlands 72.762 109.555
UK 90.783 108.411
Denmark 88.802 111.193
Finland 86.886 110.959
The table shows hours worked (model predictions and data) as percent of the hours
worked in the US
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Table 3.23: The Impact of Taxation (Without Redistribution) on Employment Rates
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates Female Employment Rates Male Employment Rates
Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model
Countries with joint taxation of married couples:
US 0.771 0.771 0.699 0.700 0.841 0.841
Germany 0.687 0.757 0.610 0.693 0.762 0.821
Norway 0.805 0.780 0.763 0.710 0.847 0.850
Spain 0.610 0.782 0.445 0.716 0.774 0.857
Switzerland 0.809 0.769 0.715 0.699 0.903 0.840
Countries with separate taxation of married couples:
Greece 0.610 0.830 0.450 0.779 0.781 0.880
Italy 0.574 0.842 0.421 0.800 0.728 0.883
Belgium 0.662 0.848 0.564 0.809 0.759 0.887
Netherlands 0.737 0.843 0.637 0.800 0.835 0.885
UK 0.737 0.834 0.665 0.783 0.810 0.885
Denmark 0.779 0.855 0.733 0.823 0.823 0.888
Finland 0.718 0.854 0.684 0.816 0.751 0.891
Figure 3.20: The Impact of Taxation Without Redistribution on Employment Rates,
Both Genders
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Figure 3.21: The Impact of Taxation With Redistribution on Hours Worked, Both
Genders
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Table 3.24: The Impact of Taxation (With Redistributiion) on Hours Worked
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates
Actual Model
Countries with joint taxation of married couples:
US 100.00 100.00 0.324
Germany 88.782 70.987 0.490
Norway 92.056 83.313 0.446
Spain 100.871 73.007 0.329
Switzerland 99.869 97.234 0.302
Countries with separate taxation of married couples:
Greece 104.381 87.056 0.287
Italy 99.362 73.701 0.392
Belgium 91.562 69.167 0.551
Netherlands 97.685 72.762 0.445
UK 99.765 90.783 0.380
Denmark 89.287 88.802 0.585
Finland 97.282 86.886 0.476
The table shows hours worked (model predictions and data) as percent of the hours
worked in the US
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Table 3.25: Regressing Average Hours Worked on Divorce rate and Tax Measures
(including joint versus separate taxation of married couples)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Const 1321.374∗∗∗ 1166.408∗∗∗ 1258.269∗∗∗ 1395.375∗∗∗
(217.377) (142.989) (86.756) (115.362)
Divorce rate 27.097∗ 19.428 41.959∗∗∗ 36.638∗∗∗
(14.248) (14.142) (12.010) (11.163)
Top marginal tax rate −6.413 – – –
( 4.497)
Progressivity wedge – −629.507 – –
(557.163)
Average labor income tax – – −1183.122∗∗∗ –
(334.931)
Average effective tax rate – – – −1160.108∗∗∗
(318.644)
Separate Taxation 0.197 -0.002 16.046 32.918
(59.042) (61.365) (45.244) (45.770)
adjusted R2 0.085 0.037 0.460 0.476
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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